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I 
INTRODUCTION 
In the introductory essay to this symposium, I define probable cause as 
having four components: one quantitative (How certain must the police be?), 
one qualitative (How strong must the supporting data sources be?), one 
temporal (When must police and courts make their judgments?), and one moral 
(Do the police have “individualized suspicion”1?).2 My focus in this article is on 
the last of these components. “Individualized suspicion,” the United States 
Supreme Court has suggested, is perhaps the most important of the four 
components of probable cause.3 That is a position with which I heartily agree. 
The other three components each play only a supporting role. But 
individualized suspicion is the beating heart that gives probable cause its 
vitality.4 
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 1. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976) (“[I]ndividualized suspicion is 
usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure.”). 
2.  See Andrew E. Tasltiz, Foreword, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. i, i–ii (Summer 2010). 
 3. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 37273 (2003) (“‘The substance of all the definitions of 
probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt,’ and that the belief of guilt must be 
particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized.”) (quoting McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 
Pa. 63, 69 (1881), and citing Ybarra v. Illinois, 445 U.S. 85 (1979)). 
 4. See Tracy Maclin, The Pringle Case’s New Notion of Probable Cause: An Assault on Di Re and 
the Fourth Amendment, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 395, 41012 (summarizing the history of the 
individualized-suspicion requirement); id. at 411 (“It is a fair summary of the history of the Fourth 
Amendment to say that the provision reflected the Framers’ desire to control the discretion of ordinary 
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Roughly defined, individualized suspicion is the idea that the state should 
judge each citizen based upon his own unique actions, character, thoughts, and 
situation.5 The state should not base its judgments on stereotypes, assumptions, 
guilt-by-association, or other generalities.6 As central as individualized suspicion 
is to defining probable cause, however, such suspicion also plays a role in 
cognate concepts, primarily “reasonable suspicion.”7 Accordingly, fully 
understanding individualized suspicion requires examining both probable cause 
and its junior partner, reasonable suspicion. That partner is generally defined as 
a sort of “probable cause light,” resting on a lower level of certainty and weaker 
data sources than probable cause, but otherwise retaining its core commitment 
to individualized treatment.8 Understanding the Court’s approach to such 
matters sets the stage for the conceptual discussion that follows. 
A.  Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding 
1. The Tip Behind a Strip Search 
One recent example of the Court’s giving serious weight to a commitment to 
individualized suspicion, even under the less-muscular reasonable-suspicion 
standard, is Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding.9 There, a middle 
school’s policies prohibited students possessing, while in school, any 
prescription or over-the-counter drugsincluding ibuprofenwithout prior 
 
law enforcement officers and to eliminate governmental intrusions lacking particularized suspicion.”) 
(emphasis added). See also ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A 
HISTORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 17891868 258–59 (2006) (summarizing history’s teachings 
concerning the individualized-suspicion requirement). 
 5. Cf. Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice through Psychological Character 
Evidence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1, 330 (1993) (explaining the social-science and philosophical literature 
defining the “individualized justice” principle in substantive and evidentiary criminal lawa principle 
conceptually indistinguishable from the “individualized suspicion” aspect of probable cause). 
 6. See TASLITZ, supra note 4, at 25859 (making a similar point); Maclin, supra note 4, at 395 
(“Americans have rightly believed that an individual should not be judged solely on the basis of the 
company that he keeps. Fourth Amendment law has embraced a similar norm.”). 
 7. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), first articulated the “reasonable suspicion” standard and 
described the standard as to frisks as involving an officer’s having “reason to believe that he is dealing 
with an armed and dangerous individual” (emphasis added). Terry noted as well that “due weight must 
be given, not to [the officer’s] inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific 
reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” Id. 
 8. In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990), the Court explained, reasonable suspicion is a 
less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be 
established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish 
probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less 
reliable than that required to show probable cause. See also United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 
(1989) (remarking that the level of suspicion for reasonable suspicion “is considerably less than proof of 
wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence” and less than a “fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found”“fair probability” being the definition of the quantum of evidence 
necessary to proving probable cause); C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta 
of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1325 (1982) (summarizing a survey 
of federal judges quantifying reasonable suspicion as an average certainty of thirty-one percent). 
 9. 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009). 
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permission. That policy was triggered when a male student told Assistant 
Principal Kerry Wilson that “certain students were bringing drugs and weapons 
on campus.”10 The student also said that he had gotten sick after taking some 
pills that “he got from a classmate.”11 That boy later gave Wilson a white pill, 
claiming that he had gotten it from Marissa Glines. The student nurse identified 
the pill as prescription-strength ibuprofen. Wilson pulled Marissa from her class 
and showed her a day planner that her teacher had found within Marissa’s reach 
that contained, among other things, knives and a cigarette. Wilson asked 
Marissa to empty her pockets and to show the contents of her wallet, which she 
did. Her doing so revealed two pills—one blue, one white—and a razor blade. 
Marissa insisted that she had gotten the ibuprofen from thirteen-year-old 
Savana Redding but denied knowing anything about the day planner’s contents. 
Wilson then ordered the school nurse and an administrative assistant to conduct 
a body search of Marissa. That search included examining her bra and panties, 
which revealed no further pills. 
A week later, Wilson called Savana Redding into his office, where she 
admitted to owning the day planner but said that “she had lent it to Marissa.”12 
Savana denied knowing anything about the contraband it had contained. Wilson 
had learned from other staff members that Savana and Marissa were friends 
and had been “part of an unusually rowdy group at the school’s opening dance 
in August, during which alcohol and cigarettes were found in the girls’ 
bathroom.”13 He and his administrative assistant, Helen Romero, consequently 
searched Savana’s backpack, with Savana’s consent, to no avail.14 
At Wilson’s instruction, Romero and the school nurse asked Savana to 
remove all her clothes down to her bra and panties; Savana complied. Savana 
again complied when instructed to “pull her bra out and to the side,” to shake 
it, and to pull out her underpants’ elastic, “thus exposing her breasts and pelvic 
area to some degree.”15 
Savana’s mother filed suit against the school district, Wilson, Romero, and 
the school nurse for violating Savana’s Fourth Amendment rights by conducting 
a strip search. The District Court for the District of Arizona found the claim 
meritless, granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.16 
 
 10. Id. at 2640. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 2641. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 2638. 
 15. Id. 
 16. A Ninth Circuit panel affirmed. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 504 F.3d 828 (9th 
Cir. 2007). But sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding a Fourth Amendment violation 
under law “clearly established” at the time, thus denying qualified immunity and reversing summary 
judgment as to Wilson, though upholding summary judgment as to other defendants on other grounds. 
Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 531 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
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2. The Role of Humiliation in Defining the Relevant “Reasonable 
Suspicion” 
The United States Supreme Court found a violation of Savana’s Fourth 
Amendment rights. The Court relied specifically on its probable-cause 
jurisprudence, at least concerning how reliable, credible, and specific the 
information upon which the state relied had to be to establish the necessary 
individualized suspicion.17 The Court did note, however, that probable cause 
requires sufficient proof of a “substantial chance” of discovering evidence of 
criminality, while the lesser school-searches standard of reasonable suspicion 
“could as readily be described as a moderate chance of finding evidence of 
wrongdoing.”18 
The Court determined whether this standard had been met by dividing the 
search into two stages: first, the search of Savana’s backpack, outer clothing, 
and bag; second, the “strip search of Savana.”19 The Court created this 
dichotomy because the humiliating nature of the strip search, especially given 
Savana’s age, was far more intrusive than that of the backpack and related 
searches, thus requiring separate justification, including separate individualized 
suspicion to believe that contraband was not simply on her person or property 
but in her underwear. Indeed, the Court readily found reasonable suspicion for 
Wilson’s believing that Savana may have had contraband on her person or in 
her backpack or outer clothing. But the Court found suspicion inadequate to 
believe either that the contraband posed a serious danger to the students (after 
all, only small quantities of ibuprofen and related common pain relievers were 
involved) or “that Savanna was carrying pills in her underwear.”20 As to the 
latter, the Court carefully distinguished among generalizations about what sorts 
of students might possess the pills versus specific reasons, rooted in trustworthy 
evidence, to believe that this student, Savana—and not anyone else—had them 
in her underwear.21 
3. The Inadequacy of Generalizations 
The defendants had argued, as a “truth universally acknowledged,” that 
students often hide contraband in their clothing, including in their underwear, 
citing several examples of the latter.22 However, said the Court, the extreme 
intrusiveness of adolescent strip searches “requires some justification in 
[specific] suspected facts,” so “general background possibilities fall short . . . .”23 
Accordingly, a “reasonable search that extensive calls for [individualized] 
 
 17. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2009). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 2641 (“The exact label for this final step in the intrusion is not important, though strip 
search is a fair way to speak of it.”). 
 20. Id. at 2643 (emphasis added). 
 21. See id. at 264344. 
 22. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2642 (2009). 
 23. Id. 
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suspicion that it will pay off.”24 Yet the record included no evidence of the 
alleged general practice in the Safford Middle School of hiding contraband in 
underwear.25 More importantly, explained the Court, “neither [the male student 
tipster] nor Marissa [had] suggested to Wilson that Savana was [hiding 
contraband in her underwear], and the preceding search of Marissa that Wilson 
[had] ordered [had] yielded nothing.”26 Nor did the nondangerous type of 
contraband suspected raise the “specter of stashes in intimate places . . . .”27 
Furthermore, noted the Court, Wilson had failed to conduct the sort of 
additional investigation that might have linked the evidence he already had to 
Savana’s underwear. For example, Wilson had never asked Marissa when she 
had purportedly received the pills from Savana. Had they been received days 
before, that would have counted against reasonable suspicion that Savana 
currently had them on her person, “much less in her underwear.”28 Nor had 
Wilson asked Marissa where Savana might be hiding the pills. 
The Court clearly considered, however, the presence, absence, or nature of 
a variety of generalizations relevant to its inquiry. But it questioned whether 
there was hard evidence to support such generalizations. Even more critical to 
its holding was that generalizations were not enough; there had to be additional 
case-specific facts that, when combined with the supportable generalizations, 
established reasonable suspicion to believe that this suspect, at this time, hid 
contraband in the specific location of her underwear. Moreover, that 
underwear-specific suspicion had to be based primarily on her own actions, 
mental state, and personal history.29 Furthermore, although the Court found the 
intrusiveness of the strip search to be a “quantum leap”30 above that of the 
backpack and related searches, it did so primarily to justify its two-stage 
division of the searches. It did not rely on the intrusiveness of the search alone 
as its rationale. Indeed, having made this division, the Court described its 
remaining conclusions as turning on the combination of the nondangerous 
nature of the contraband and the lack of adequate individualized evidence that 
the contraband was then in Savana’s underwear: 
[W]hat was missing from the suspected facts that pointed to Savana was any indication 
of danger to the students from the power of the drugs or their quantity, and any 
reason to suppose that Savana was carrying pills in her underwear. We think that the 
combination of these deficiencies was fatal to finding the search reasonable.31 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See infra II.A (defining “individualized suspicion”). 
 30. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2643 (2009). 
 31. Id. at 2642–43 (emphasis added). 
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Moreover, despite the particularly intrusive nature of the strip search,32 the 
Court has applied a similarly vigorous approach to individualized suspicion in 
several other less-troubling circumstances.33 Redding would also suggest that the 
Court is likely to even more aggressively defend the individualized-suspicion 
requirement in probable-cause cases because reasonable suspicion is a lesser 
standard than probable cause. Likewise, the Court might be more aggressive in 
contexts other than that of the middle-school, in which courts pay a “high 
degree of deference” to the “educator’s professional judgment.”34 Redding 
might thus be seen as an exemplar of the Court’s zealous commitment to the 
individualized-suspicion ideal.  
B.  Cutting Samson’s Hair: The Lapsed Commitment to Individualized Justice 
Nevertheless, such a judgment would be flatly wrong. The Court itself has 
often readily dispensed entirely with an individualized-suspicion mandate. At 
first, it did this largely in “special needs” or “administrative search” cases, those 
whose “primary objective programmatic purpose” was other than criminal 
investigation.35 Examples include random drug testing for individuals in safety-
sensitive jobs, health and safety inspections, and inventory searches.36 Next, it 
expanded these “special needs” searches and seizures to contexts that would 
seem to the layperson to be at least partly criminal investigation but that the 
Court insisted “primarily” involved other purposes. These searches and seizures 
included drunk-driving roadblocks, searches of automobile junkyards for stolen 
property, and even searches of probationers and parolees for contraband (likely 
resulting in revocation of their probation or parole and prosecution for a new 
 
 32. The Court did suggest at several points that its relatively vigorous examination of evidence of 
individualized suspicion that contraband was in Savana’s underwear might be attributed to the highly 
intrusive nature of the strip search. For example, “[W]hen the categorically extreme intrusiveness of a 
search down to the body of an adolescent requires some justifications in suspected facts, general 
background possibilities of criminal conduct fall short . . . .” Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2642 (emphasis 
added). This statement might be read as meaning that when searches of young students are not by 
definition extremely intrusive, mere “general background possibilities”what I have here called 
“generalizations”might be sufficient. See id. (“Here, the content of the suspicion failed to match the 
degree of the intrusion.”). 
 33. See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1987) (requiring reasonable suspicion that 
knocking and announcing police presence before executing a warrant would be futile or dangerous, or 
that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime). 
 34. See Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643. 
 35. See ANDREW E. TASLITZ, MARGARET L. PARIS & LENESE HERBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 400–18 (3d ed. 2007) (defining “special needs” and “administrative” searches). 
Though the definition of “primary objective programmatic purpose” is unclear, and the details of the 
debate not worth pursuing here, see Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Fourth Amendment?: Consent, 
Care, Privacy, and Social Meaning in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1 
(2002), for a stab at its definition.  
 36. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 40205, 40818, 44248 (summarizing case 
law). The Court has also found one seizurebriefly stopping cars to see if anyone had witnessed a 
recent hit-and-runto be administrative, even though its objective was to investigate crime, because 
the persons stopped were not those suspected of that crime. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004). 
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offense) or evidence of other crimes.37 The Court has also eliminated any 
individualized-suspicion requirement for some clear criminal searches, such as 
searches incident to arrest and consent searches,38 and has repeatedly expanded 
the arguably watered-down version of individualized suspicion, namely 
reasonable suspicion, from its roots in Terry v. Ohio “stop-and-frisks”39 to a 
wide range of other contexts.40 
Throughout its frequent jettisoning of an individualized-suspicion mandate, 
the Court has nevertheless often suggested that it has done so only in a few, 
relatively narrow “exceptions” to an otherwise controlling individualized-
suspicion presumption.41 Recently, however, it has more candidly rejected, or at 
least diluted, any such presumption. Thus, in Samson v. California,42 an officer 
searched the person of someone the officer recognized as a parolee. The officer 
admitted that he entirely lacked any individualized suspicion, but he searched 
simply because he saw subjection to suspicionless searches for evidence of crime 
as a condition of parole. The Court upheld the search, though it was clearly 
done for the purposes of criminal investigation. Justice Thomas, writing for the 
Court, declared, 
The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, not individualized 
suspicion. Thus, while this Court’s jurisprudence has often recognized that “to 
accommodate public and private interests some quantum of individualized suspicion is 
usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure,” we have also recognized 
that the “Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such 
suspicion . . . .” Therefore, although this Court has only sanctioned suspicionless 
searches in limited circumstances, namely, programmatic and special needs searches, 
we have never held that these are the only limited circumstances in which searches 
absent individualized suspicion could be “reasonable” . . . .43 
Indeed, continued Justice Thomas, the officer’s search of parolee Samson was 
reasonable given California’s concerns about “recidivism, public safety, and 
reintegration of parolees into productive society . . . .”44 This conclusion, said 
Justice Thomas, was neither “unprecedented” nor “remarkable.”45 
 
 37. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 41923 (probationers and parolees), 
42931, 43639 (roadblocks), 407 ( “junkyard” search case). 
 38. See id. at 37279, 44868 (searches incident to arrest and consent searches). 
 39. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 40. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 38081, 408, 41920 (explaining, for 
example, the Court’s holdings extending the reasonable-suspicion inquiry to certain “protective sweeps 
of residences” for dangerous persons when an arrest is made there, fairly invasive searches of school 
children’s bodies, and searches of probationers’ and parolees’ homes). 
 41. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 80 (2001) (noting individualized suspicion 
is generally dispensed with only in special needs and related cases); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 
309 (1997) (describing the “category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches” as “closely 
guarded”). 
 42. 547 U.S. 843 (2006). 
 43. Id. at 855 n.4 (citations omitted). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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But Justice Stevens, in a dissent joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, 
insisted that Thomas’s conclusion was indeed unprecedented because “[t]he 
suspicionless search is the very evil the Fourth Amendment was intended to 
stamp out.”46 Accordingly, exceptions to its prohibition should be “closely 
guarded.”47 Moreover, insisted Stevens, “if individualized suspicion is to be 
jettisoned, it must be replaced with measures to protect against the state actor’s 
unfettered discretion,”48 measures that Stevens found missing despite the 
majority’s insistence that California law’s broadly worded statutory prohibition 
against “arbitrary, capricious or harassing” searches was sufficient.49 But Stevens 
had little confidence that better discretion-limiting means than individualized 
suspicion were either feasible or wise. Concluded Stevens, 
The requirement of individualized suspicion, in all its iterations, is the shield the 
Framers selected to guard against the evils of arbitrary action, caprice, and 
harassment. To say that those evils may be averted without that shield is, I fear, to pay 
lipservice to the end while withdrawing the means.50 
Finally, said Stevens, such lipservice is counterproductive because searches 
and seizures lacking individualized suspicion “inflic[t] dignitary harms that 
arouse strong resentment in parolees and undermine their ability to reintegrate 
into society.”51 
C.  Lip Service 
Yet the Court, as well as lower courts, pays “lip service” in other cases too, 
insisting that it is retaining and vigorously applying a rule of individualized 
suspicion while doing no such thing. For example, the Court sometimes finds a 
small number of generalizations alone sufficient to establish individualized 
reasonable suspicion, as it infamously did in holding that unprovoked flight 
from the police in high-crime (generally meaning poor, predominantly racial-
minority-populated) areas, but not low-crime ones, alone establishes reasonable 
suspicion to stop a suspect52generalizations whose accuracy are themselves 
belied by empirical evidence, at least according to the dissenters in that case 
and to several commentators.53 Lower courts seem to have taken this and other 
holdings of the Court as a signal, repeatedly finding “individualized” reasonable 
suspicion on the most general of evidence.54 
 
 46. Id. at 857–58 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 47. Id. at 860 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 48. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 860 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 49. Id. at 841 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 50. Id. at 866 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 51. Id. at 865 (citing the majority opinion, 547 U.S. at 856, and citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 
29 (1968)). 
 52. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
 53. See id. at 12639 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Andrew E. Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment 
Disrespect: From Elian to the Internment, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2257, 2294300 (2002). 
 54. See David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric 
Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 975 (1998). 
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In the area of probable cause, lower courts often apply somewhat vapid 
generalizations as universal principles to determine the likely credibility of 
informants, particularly when informants’ stories directly contradict one 
another, thus ignoring the case-specific adequacy of these generalizations. Thus 
courts generally assume that citizen (as opposed to criminal) informants and 
police informants are truthful, that discrepancies within eyewitness’s 
descriptions are unimportant, that putative victims with potential ulterior 
motives still do not lie, and that private retail-store guards are inherently 
credible.55 These same courts generally reject skepticism or the need for further 
investigation, despite evidence suggesting the wisdom of both.56 
Likewise, many courts rely increasingly on “constructive probable cause,” 
finding probable cause in hindsight from combining the knowledge of several 
officers, none of whom individually had reasonable suspicion. Courts construct 
probable cause even absent case-specific proof that officers ever exchanged the 
information.57 Similarly, the Court has recently found individualized probable 
cause based largely on guilt by association, while insisting it was doing no such 
thing.58 
Still another complication arises from the position of some judges and 
academics (though a minority position among the courts) that probable cause is 
a variable standard, its meaning changing with a variety of circumstances, 
including the crime’s severity, whether the social harm has occurred or 
imminently will occur, and a host of other factors.59 Prominent adherents of this 
position include Judges Henry Friendly and Richard Posner and academic 
theorists Joseph Grano, Albert Alschuler, Craig Lerner, and William Stuntz.60 
Although these writers tend to focus on the variability of the quantitative (how 
convinced must the reasonable officer be?) and qualitative (did that officer rely 
on sufficiently trustworthy evidence?) aspects of probable cause, the logic of 
their position would also embrace accepting variability in the degree of required 
individualization as well.61 
 
 55. See Jessica Ward, Do the Clothes Make the Man?: Implications of a Witness’ Status in the 
Determination of Probable Cause, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2005 (2001). 
 56. See id. 
 57. See Simon Stern, Constructive Knowledge, Probable Cause, and Administrative 
Decisionmaking, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1085 (2007). 
 58. See Maclin, supra note 4 (reviewing the case law on guilt by association and concluding that, in 
a post–Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003), world, the Court embraces such guilt). For a discussion 
of Pringle’s facts and reasoning, see TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 18994. 
 59. See, e.g., Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951 (2003). 
 60. See Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 156566 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (opinion authored by 
Richard Posner); United States v. Soyka, 394 F.2d 443, 45253 (2d. Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., dissenting);  
Albert Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 227, 24556 
(1984); Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 
17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 465, 50305 (1984); Lerner, supra note 59, at 101525; William Stuntz, Local 
Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 213743, 2185 (2002). 
 61. See Lerner, supra note 59, at 101521 (summarizing these thinkers’ views and adding Lerner’s 
own). 
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In the pages to come, I will not be challenging the notion that individualized 
suspicion must sometimes be diluted or even eliminated to serve sound 
constitutional policy. By constitutional policy, I mean the most desirable way to 
accommodate the tension among individual interests, state interests, and the 
safety and security of the People.62 But I am arguing that fiddling with 
individualized suspicion, if done, must be done candidly, with reluctance and 
caution, and with full awareness of the costs and benefits involved. Such 
awareness must extend as well to a careful judgment about whether the costs 
exceed the benefits and to how to reduce those costs. Cost considerations must, 
of course, include reducing the opportunity costs of not using, or of 
substantially weakening, individualized suspicion. 
My primary goal in this article, therefore, is to specify the costs and benefits 
of individualized suspicion, though primarily the benefits because they, unlike 
the costs, have rarely been closely analyzed. Indeed, the benefits of 
individualized suspicion are usually recounted at a high level of generality, 
situated in vague appeals to history, tradition, justice, and state phobia, with 
little real explanation of what they mean or why we should care.63 Nevertheless, 
though the costs of individualized suspicion have been concretely recited 
elsewhere, I hope to do so here in a slightly different manner than other 
theorists to highlight their significance more starkly. This article is thus 
decidedly an exercise in pragmatic constitutionalism, focusing more on the real-
world consequences of constitutional rules than on the history, tradition, and 
precedent often used in constitutional interpretation (though these too play an 
illustrative role here).64 
D.  A Roadmap 
Section II of this article examines in more detail just what defines 
individualized suspicion. Some critics seem to believe that it does not exist, a 
delusion resting on a false and exaggerated understanding of the distinction 
between the general and the particular. That is a view I hope to debunk. 
Section III explores the benefits of individualized suspicion. Those benefits 
include error-reduction; individual and group-voice-promotion in political 
 
 62. Cf. 16A AM. JUR. Const. Law §467 & nn.1213 (2010) (describing case law on constitutional 
free speech as embodying a “constitutional policy” reflecting a “profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it may well 
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public 
officials”); Andrew E. Taslitz, Search and Seizure History as Conversation: A Reply to Bruce P. Smith, 6 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 765 (2009) (articulating an extended defense of the roles of history and numerous 
other data sources in crafting constitutional policy under the Fourth Amendment, a constitutional 
“conversation” that partly defines American peoplehood). 
 63. See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318, 322 (1997) (holding that overriding the normal 
preference for individualized suspicion requires state demonstration of an interest sufficiently 
“important,” “vital,” and “substantial,” a test not met by a justification that “diminishes personal 
privacy for a symbol’s sake”). 
 64. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 725 (summarizing the various data sources 
used in constitutional interpretation). 
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affairs; encouraging deliberation, transparency, and accountability by law 
enforcement; avoiding self-fulfilling prophecies; showing respect for persons by 
honoring what makes each individual unique; discouraging racial bias; and 
promoting strong, pragmatic rights-cultures. 
Section IV starts by briefly outlining the well-known costs of individualized 
suspicion. Those costs include freeing some of the guilty; undermining crime-
deterrence; failing to prevent imminent future harm, especially if connected to 
terrorism; raising the costs of investigation; reducing public safety and 
governmental legitimacy more generally; and pushing courts to limit the Fourth 
Amendment’s scope to avoid incurring other costs. 
Section IV continues by offering guidelines for balancing costs and benefits 
in individual cases, including ways to reduce the costs of dispensing with or 
diluting individualized suspicion in its most muscular form when that is deemed 
workable. Examples analyzed will include an illustrative case involving the 
Court’s reliance on a spurious generalization. 
Section V concludes by summarizing what has come before and offering 
thoughts for the future. 
II 
WHAT IS “INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION,” AND WHY SHOULD WE CARE? 
This section rebuts two broad claims. First, generalities, not particularities, 
are the hallmark of sound reasoning; particularized analysis is thus an illusion. 
Second, the benefits of generalizing ordinarily exceed its costs, while the same 
cannot be said for individualizing. Both rebuttals address “nonspurious”that 
is, trustworthygeneralizations, the argument becoming even stronger for 
spurious or suspect ones. Illustrative pit bulls, big sisters, jealous boyfriends, 
and Jersey cops will appear along the way. But first one must ask, with more 
conceptual specificity than scholars have done so far, “Just what is 
individualized suspicion anyway?” 
A.  Defining Individualized Suspicion 
“[T]o generalize is to be an idiot. To particularize is the alone distinction of merit.”65 
1. Pit Bulls and the Purported Perils of Particularism 
Law professor and philosopher Frederick Schauer has railed against what he 
calls “particularism.” Particularism, as he defines it, is the idea that right 
decisions turn most importantly on doing what is right for this case, this person, 
this occasion.66 “Rightness” here is not only a matter of accuracy but also of 
morality and justice.67 Thus, to the pure particularist, 
 
 65. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES AND STEREOTYPES x (2003) (quoting 
WILLIAM BLAKE, ANNOTATIONS TO SIR JOSHUA REYNOLD’S DISCOURSES (1808)). 
 66. See id. at ix, 1920. 
 67. See id. 
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[a]ll human beingsteenage males who drive cars, ex-convicts, used-car salesmen, 
Scots, accountants, and everyone elsedeserve to be treated as individuals and not 
simply as members of a group . . . and actuarial decisions about human beings are in 
most instances morally wrong.68 
Schauer argues instead for the virtues of generalization, which he sees as 
pervasive in our decisionmaking, inevitable, and frequently more accurate, and 
often more just, than the “context[ualism]” of the particularists.69 Despite this 
harsh rhetoric, however, Schauer ends up defending a more-modest version of 
his thesis, and it is this more-modest version that is illuminating here. 
Schauer bases much of his thesis on the argument that there is in fact no 
conceptual distinction between the particular and the general. He uses anti-pit-
bull ordinances as an example. These ordinances prohibit pit-bull ownership in 
certain localities on the theory that this breed of dog is far more dangerous to 
life and limb than other breeds.70 Pit-bull lovers assail these ordinances as based 
on an unfair generalization, unfair either because it is untrue or, if often true, 
because it is not true of their pit bulls.71 
A more particularistic alternative, Schauer posits, would be to put each pit 
bull in a room with a realistic-looking doll of a seven-year-old child to see 
whether this particular dog reacts violently.72 But, says Schauer, the value of this 
experiment itself turns on a generalization, namely, that a pit bull who is 
aggressive in everyday, noncontrolled situations with real children will reveal 
that aggression in controlled experiments with simulated ones.73 Yet, if that 
assumption is warranted, it can only be so because we have observed many 
other pit bulls, under otherwise similar circumstances, who have attacked real 
children, also consistently doing so with the laboratory imitations.74 Concludes 
Schauer, 
It turns out, therefore, that even analyses that look individualized are less so than they 
initially appear, because even individualized analyses are based on aggregate data 
about the relevance of certain traits. What distinguishes the individualized 
examination from the so-called profile, therefore, is only the fact that the latter is 
obvious without closer inspection while the former is not, and that in some, but by no 
means all, of the cases the individualized analysis will provide a better predictor of the 
relevant behavior. But what appears to be an individualized analysis is simply an 
aggregate of stereotypes . . . .75 
 
 68. Id. at 19. 
 69. See id. at 1921; see also WILLIAM JAMES, PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 209 (1890) (“[T]he 
highest ethical life of the mind consists at all times in the breaking of rules which have grown too 
narrow for the actual case.”). 
 70. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 5556. 
 71. See id. at 5658. But see Sallyanne K. Sullivan, Banning the Pit Bull: Why Breed-Specific 
Legislation Is Constitutional, 13 U. DAYTON L. REV. 279 (1988) (praising pit-bull ordinances). 
 72. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 6566. 
 73. See id. at 66. 
 74. See id. at 67. 
 75. Id. at 68–69. As Schauer recognizes, however, a broad array of philosophers, lawyers, and 
feminists vehemently reject his conclusion. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 
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2.  A Spectrum, Not a Dichotomy 
But Schauer makes several important concessions. First, this quote seems to 
speak of relative degrees of generality rather than a dichotomy of generality 
versus specificity. Thus, he does not say that analyses that look individualized 
are not so, but rather only that they are “less so” than they at first appear.76 
Second, he later recognizes that “smaller generalizations” are often better 
predictors than “larger ones.”77 Although he does not define these terms, his 
examples suggest that “smaller generalizations” refer to the intersection of 
many overlapping broader generalizations, thus narrowing the range of 
individual cases covered by the stereotype (Schauer frequently uses the terms 
“stereotype” and “generalization” interchangeably). For example, the 
generalization that “young, non-neutered male pit bulls previously owned by 
drug dealers, while having a proclivity to growl and having been trained for 
aggression, are more likely to engage in unprovoked attacks against children” is 
a small generalization, a “little stereotype.”78 A Venn diagram might clarify the 
point: 
  
KEY:  
G:  Growling proclivity 
DD: Drug-dealer–owned 
AT: Aggression-trained 
 
 
 
For clarity, this diagram considers only three of the traits from the pit-bull 
examplegrowling proclivity, previously drug-dealer–owned, and aggression-
trained. But note that the shaded area, where these three traits intersect, is 
much smaller than the circles representing each trait alone. In a diagram adding 
the other traits of breed, gender, being nonneutered, and being young, the 
shaded area would be smaller still. Schauer agrees that this little stereotype is 
probably a better predictor of behavior than, and in some sense different from, 
the bigger ones in isolation.79 But he sees this difference as one of degree, not 
kind.80 
 
HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990) (feminist and law professor); see also JONATHAN DANCY, MORAL 
REASONS (1993) (philosopher). 
 76. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 6869. 
 77. See id. at 6869, 96 (using “smaller rather than larger” stereotypes language while insisting that 
stereotypes are sometimes better at predicting than seemingly more-individualized analyses). 
 78. Id. at 6869. 
 79. See id.; cf. infra text accompanying notes 65–75 (summarizing Schauer’s arguments concerning 
the relative error rates of particulars versus generalities). 
 80. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 69 (noting that when we engage in a seemingly individualized 
analysis of a pit bull’s behavior, “we are not doing anything fundamentally different from what we do 
when we make a prediction based on this dog’s being a pit bull”). 
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3.  When Quantitative Differences Become Qualitative 
Quantitative differences often thereby become qualitative ones. Height 
differences, for example, are not differences in kind within a certain range, but, 
at the extremes, they change our world. The humor in a movie like Honey, I 
Shrunk the Kids!,81 about a scientist who shrinks himself and his kids to the size 
of ants, comes precisely from the audience’s intuitively recognizing this point. 
Even focusing just on physical differences, the shrunken movie family faces 
existential threats that the rest of us do notdeath by termites, mosquitoes, 
mice, falling flowers, and ruts in soil. But they also can do things we cannot, 
such as crawl through keyholes, spy from mouse holes, and fill their bellies 
happily with crumbs fallen to the floor. Their world even looks different than 
when they were large, for they see skin pores as craters, snowflakes as works of 
art, grass as skyscrapers.82 Their social world is radically changed, too. They are 
invisible to the big people and, if they were visible, they would be treated like 
lab rats, neither free nor able to safely attend movies, commute to work, or visit 
libraries as they choose. Their social circle becomes limited to those who can 
most understand their plight: other very little people. 
a. Dogs who are one-of-a-kind. Return to the less-fanciful pit-bull 
example. If hundreds of traits were added into the mix, it would be hard to see 
an individual pit bull as just a collection of stereotypes. Adding the size of a 
particular dog’s littermates; how he got along with them; who his trainer was; 
what the training regimen was; whether there were many times that he refused 
to fight, even upon his master’s orders; indeed, all his behaviors and life 
experiences would be illustrated by not just a very small Venn diagram of a 
kind of pit bull, but rather a pretty good description of one particular pit bull: 
“Rex.”  Yet even this unusual, perhaps one-of-a-kind, combination of numerous 
intersecting generalities would not do Rex justice. Rex may display unique, or 
at least rare, traits that distinguish him from other pit bulls in a way that the 
intersectionality of generalities simply does not adequately capture. 
b. People who are one-of-a-kind. The argument is perhaps stronger for 
human beings, whose complex, ambiguous, contradictory minds and 
personalities allow for extraordinary combinations of behaviors and traits, and 
who are arguably even more intensely social than dogs.83 A human belongs not 
simply to a pack, breed, or gender, but to churches, political organizations, 
movie fan clubs, book clubs, ethnicities, high schools, block associations, and 
varied other groups.84 Each of us varies in the intensity with which we associate 
with each type of group, but we define ourselves in part by our group 
associations, including our workplaces, families, and friends.85 Simultaneously, 
 
 81. HONEY, I SHRUNK THE KIDS (Buena Vista Pictures 1989). 
 82. My description of Honey, I Shrunk the Kids is not only of what the movie depicted but also of 
what it could have depicted given the movie’s premise. The “could haves” are inspired by Jonathan 
Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels. 
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we strive for some measure of uniqueness within each group and in distinction 
from them all.86 There is significant empirical evidence that we succeed in doing 
so.87 In any event, each of us is unique (and this would apply to animals too) 
because only each person, and no one else, has experienced his own life. 
For example, my parents tell me that my big sister, Ellen Nora, then five-
and-one-half years old, was scheduled to have her tonsils out when my mother 
went into labor with me. My dad accompanied my sister to the operating room 
but explained to her why he had to leave her alone for awhile with the nurse 
and the doctor. My sister became so stressed by this turn of events that she 
leaped off the table before her IV could be inserted, bit a huge hole in the 
nurse’s leg, and kicked the surgeon hard in his groin! She then fled. The 
hospital sued my nearly judgment-proof parents for quite a bit of money. 
Perhaps others have experienced a similar chain of events (though I suspect 
very few), but only this doctor and this nurse had the life experience of being 
assaulted by my big sister. 
Perhaps, as with dogs in many states, my parents should have been subjected 
to the “one-bite rule”88free from suit for my sister’s attack on the nurse but 
not free from liability for future such attacks. The underlying rationale for such 
a rule is that once the individual dog (or, here, individual child) has shown 
violence, that is good particularized evidence of this dog’s (or this child’s) 
dangerous proclivities.89 As the pit bulls’ defenders put it, punish “deeds, not 
breeds.”90 
However, Schauer objects to this argument because it applies only after the 
harm is done.91 That cost, he argues, is too great; it is better to rely on 
probabilistic prediction to prevent harms in the first place than to adopt an 
individualized approach that triggers liability only once someone has suffered.92 
 
 83. See generally MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, HUMAN: THE SCIENCE BEHIND WHAT MAKES US 
UNIQUE (2008) (arguing for the uniqueness and complexity, especially the social complexity, of the 
human animal). 
 84. See ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 13437 (1999). 
 85. See id. at 135, explaining, 
[H]arm to the individual harms the group. We partly define ourselves by our group 
affiliations. Are we black or white? Jewish or Christian? Republican or Democrat? Our 
attitudes, beliefs, and assumptions are in part shaped by the groups with which we identify. 
Gender . . . is certainly at the core of self-identity. Our sense of being ‘male’ or ‘female’ and 
what we believe that means are central to who we are. Although all individuals are unique, 
some part of how we express ourselves draws on group self-concepts as ‘man’ or ‘woman.’ 
 86. See infra text accompanying notes 33382. 
 87. See id. 
 88. See J.D. Lee & Barry A. Lindahl, Liability for Wild and Domestic Animals, in 4 MODERN 
TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 37:5 (2d ed. 2009). 
 89. See id. 
 90. Alexandra Stanley, New York Acts to Lift Pit Bull Controls, N.Y. TIMES, March 12, 1991, at B1. 
 91. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 70. 
 92. See id. at 7071. 
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This argument is important for several reasons. Notably, it assumes that 
individualization is indeed something real and not merely a form of 
generalization in disguise.93 Furthermore, it accepts that whether this is a good 
or a bad thing is a contextual question requiring a balancing of costs and 
benefits.94 Finally, his argument reveals that the probative value of more-
individualized evidence is nevertheless dependent upon a generalization. In the 
case of the one-bite rule, that generalization is that an individual’s prior actual 
behavior (whether the individual is dog or human) is a useful (not necessarily 
perfect or even more likely than not) predictor of future behavior. Yet this 
judgment still retains a relatively individualized quality because it turns on 
observations of this individual’s prior behavior rather than assumptions about 
that behavior based entirely on class membership. 
4. Of Character Evidence, Relativity, and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Predicting future behavior based on past behavior is generally a form of 
character evidence, the argument being that the prior behavior indicates the 
kind of person (or dog) you are, such persons being more likely to think or act 
in certain ways.95 One significant problem with such evidence, however, is that 
fact finders (such as juries) or other governmental decisionmakers (such as 
police) may give such evidence, despite its somewhat individualized nature, 
undue weight.96 Thus decisionmakers might ignore base rates (whether most 
dogs or persons engage in the behavior at issue at the same, or a lesser, or a 
greater rate than does this individual).97 Similarly, evidence that John has 
engaged in twice as many violent acts as most people is relevant, but only 
modestly so, if his total lifetime number of violent acts is but two.98 Additionally, 
John’s violence might be highly contextual, such as being directed only at 
unfaithful girlfriends.99 That context raises serious questions about how valuable 
John’s past violence is in predicting future violence in very different situations. 
 
 93. Id. at 6970 (“This alternative does appear to diminish the extent of predictive generalization, 
for by restricting only those dogs already determined to have committed an attack it eliminates the 
possibility of over inclusiveness, at least if we continue to assume no mistakes in the process of 
determining which dogs are guilty.”). 
 94. See id. at 125 (“If it turns out that the coarser (and thus broader) generalization fares better on 
the benefit-cost analysis, the argument for its representing a case of fundamental injustice is much 
weaker once we see that the only plausible replacement is a finer (and thus narrower) generalization.”). 
 95. See STEVEN I. FRIEDLAND, PAUL BERGMAN & ANDREW E. TASLITZ, EVIDENCE LAW AND 
PRACTICE 9094 (3d ed. 2007). 
 96. See id. at 91. 
 97. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 9495, 179, 317 n.16 (defining and illustrating “base rates”). 
 98. See FRIEDLAND, BERGMAN & TASLITZ, supra note 95, at 91; Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 
5, at 65–72 (analyzing the “predictive power” of character traits). 
 99. See FRIEDLAND, BERGMAN, & TASLITZ, supra note 95, at 91, 96 (discussing analogous gang 
members example). 
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It is for reasons like this that the law often prohibits use of character 
evidence at trials.100 Trials, of course, generally involve proving past wrongful 
behavior, but most commentators recognize that character is as relevant to 
proving what happened as to what will happen.101 Nevertheless, this relevance is 
alone insufficient to justify admissibility. Even if character evidence is more 
particularized than a highly general stereotype, the law’s treatment of the 
evidence again turns on a careful cost-benefit analysis.102 Police, like everyday 
people and judges at trials, must similarly make use of character to judge past 
guilt or future imminent criminality.103 Whether, when, and how the law should 
let them do so will thus likewise be a question of balancing. 
Despite the initial vehemence with which Schauer makes his argument, he 
ultimately concedes that he cannot totally deny the “logical distinction between 
the particular and the general.”104 Indeed, he says (and I agree) that nothing is 
gained by exploring the metaphysical literature on the question. Rather, “the 
commonsense distinction between a thing and a group of things will suffice.”105 
But Schauer is probably right that reasoning without some generalizations is 
impossible. Accordingly, there is a spectrum of relative generality versus 
specificity.106 The practical question is where, as a matter of wise policy, to place 
ourselves on that continuum. Ultimately, I disagree with Schauer only in that I 
see the place chosen on the spectrum as becoming at some point a difference in 
kind rather than degree.107 Yet we agree that where we choose to fit on the 
generality–specificity spectrum is at least partly a question of balancing the 
costs and benefits of that particular choice.108 Before examining the relevant 
costs and benefits involved in the probable-cause and individualized-suspicion 
determination in criminal cases, I turn, however, to examining the general 
nature of cost-benefit reasoning about degrees of particularity. 
 
 100. See id. at 159–64 (summarizing the character evidence rules in the Federal Rules of Evidence as 
generally barring evidence of character to prove conduct but containing a variety of exceptions, 
qualifications, and complexities). 
 101. See Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 5, at 6572. 
 102. See FRIEDLAND, BERGMAN & TASLITZ, supra note 95, at 994 (summarizing the cost-benefit 
analysis underlying the character evidence rules). 
 103. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 199200 (analyzing Fourth Amendment law 
concerning the use of character evidence to prove probable cause). 
 104. SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 10506. 
 105. See id. 
 106. See Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 5, at 2430. 
 107. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 6570. 
 108. See supra notes 9194 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Why We Should Care 
1. Nonspurious Generalizations: Some Costs and Benefits 
Schauer by no means endorses relying on all generalizations. Rather, the 
only candidates are “nonspurious” ones.109 By “nonspurious,” he means 
empirically supported.110 Thus, racial profiling relies on spurious stereotypes if 
the stereotype is wrong, or at least if its “rightness” lacks empirical proof.111 But 
to be “right,” a generalization need not be true most of the time, or even more 
often than not.112 All that is required is that there be empirical evidence that the 
assertion is more true of one group than another.113 Spuriousness is thus a 
comparative concept.114 Accordingly, if it were true that twenty percent of all 
white drivers speed on New Jersey highways, but that twenty-five percent of all 
African American drivers on those highways do so, then an officer’s staking out 
a stretch of highway traveled primarily by black drivers to maximize his catch of 
speeders would be relying upon a nonspurious stereotype115 (even this creates its 
own problems).116 
Schauer recognizes that any generalization does “imperfect justice”—that is, 
it does wrong to those members of the group who do not fit the stereotype.117 
The degree to which it does wrong is its error rate. In the New Jersey highway 
example above, the error rate for African Americans is seventy-five percenta 
very high rate. Of course, in this example, the officer will stop only those 
African Americans whom he actually sees speeding. But that would not be true 
if the stereotype were, “Twenty-five percent of African American drivers on 
New Jersey highways possess cocaine while driving, though only twenty percent 
of whites do so.” Cocaine in a glove compartment is visible to the officer only 
after he stops and searches the car. Therefore, if the African American cocaine-
user stereotype were relied upon to stop and search African American drivers, 
seventy-five percent of those stopped would be delayed, frightened, and 
humiliated, though perfectly innocentand this would be true even if the 
stereotype were nonspurious. Error rates are thus one cost to consider in 
measuring the social value of a stereotype. 
Of course, Schauer recognizes, such costs could theoretically be reduced if 
we have a means for error correction.118 However, error-correction systems can 
 
 109. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 7, 1113. 
 110. See id. at 7. 
 111. See id. at 13, 1516, 22. 
 112. See id. at 11. 
 113. See id. at 1113. 
 114. See id. at 1112. 
 115. This example is mine but is inspired by a discussion of the New Jersey police in DAVID A. 
HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK 5360 (2003). 
 116. See infra text accompanying notes 27172 (discussion of the “ratchet effect”). 
 117. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 47. 
 118. See id. at 4748. 
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be costly too.119 Thus, flatly prohibiting commercial airline pilots over age sixty 
to fly rests on the stereotype that older pilots are less likely to be physically fit 
than younger ones and consequentially less capable of flying safely.120 Even if 
this is a nonspurious stereotype, it may force some perfectly healthy, capable 
older pilots into retirement, new careers, or unemployment.121 
One alternative means of error correction would be to subject all pilots over 
age sixty to a physical. Those who pass could still fly.122 Paying for physicals, 
however, costs money.123 Additionally, the purpose of such a physical is not 
simply to determine blood pressure or white-blood-cell count but to answer the 
more ambiguous question, “Is this pilot fit to fly?” To leave such a question to 
doctors, complains Schauer, is to give them a discretion they perhaps ought not 
to have.124 Moreover, the vaguer questions like fitness to fly, turned over to 
clinical judgment, create their own error rates.125 One solution is to return to 
rule-like safeguards, for example, “You are fit to fly if your reaction time is X, 
your eyesight Y, and your blood pressure Z.” Yet that is to return to 
generalities and to the imperfect justice they provide.126 
Indeed, more broadly, Schauer objects to particularism because once we 
replace generalitiesfrequently meaning ruleswith individualized judgment, 
someone must make that judgment. If that someone must act uncontrolled by 
rules, she gains discretion, which we might have reason to fear.127 Moreover, 
Schauer insists that even experienced decisionmakers’ choices will often result 
in higher error rates than will relying upon purely actuarial judgments.128 His 
primary examples concern predictions of future dangerousness, such as 
sentencing and parole decisions for violent criminals, or in release decisions for 
 
 119. See id. at 5354. 
 120. See id. at 12426. 
 121. See id. at 10813. 
 122. See id. at 12223. 
 123. There are over 42,000 commercial-airline pilots in the United States, see id. at 122, and the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has at least implicitly concluded that the cost of periodically 
testing them all far exceeds any benefits, see id. at 126. 
 124. See SCHAUER, supra note 65. at 12223 (arguing that individualized medical testing of every 
commercial-airline pilot would likely still result in significant numbers of false positives and false 
negatives concerning the ability of each tested pilot to fly safely); id. at 5354 (arguing that all error-
correction systems introduce their own error rates and give the correctors discretion that inevitably 
results in disparities among decisions involving seemingly similar circumstances; such disparities create 
the appearance of arbitrariness). 
 125. See id. at 5354, 12223. 
 126. An approach in the middle of the generalizing spectrum would be that, rather than testing all 
pilots, we test only those over a certain age. See id. at 127. Yet this approach still is a far stretch from 
the individualized end of the spectrum and has thus far been rejected by the FAA “as too risky to 
public safety because the available tests produce too many false negatives and because certain age-
related correlates cannot be identified in advance by any existing test.” Id. at 128. The FAA’s solution, 
therefore, has simply been to mandate pilot retirement at age sixty. See id. at 108. 
 127. See id. at 5354, 12223. 
 128. See id. at 9697. 
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the mentally ill.129 He maintains that the data show the superiority in these areas 
of actuarial methods over the clinical judgments of psychologists.130 Yet more-
recent research suggests that clinical judgment combined with actuarial methods 
sometimes does an even better job.131 
Schauer also argues, however, that combining otherwise-valid profiles with 
race in certain instances increases the predictive power of law-enforcement 
profiling,132 though here, once again, other writers read the empirical data as 
showing that race generally decreases profiling’s accuracy.133 Still, the data in 
theory could come out the other way, and Schauer’s main point is simply that 
“generalism” is not always less accurate than particularism.134 Relative accuracy 
depends upon the question at issue and the state of our relevant empirical 
knowledge.135 Moreover, he asks, is it really better to replace nonspurious 
profiling with an individual officer’s unguided discretion?136 
2. The Problem of Discretion in the “Real World” of the Fourth 
Amendment 
Here Schauer again has a point. Rule-like reasoning will likely constrain 
police behavior more effectively, all else being equal, than giving police 
unconstrained discretion.137 Notably, the Fourth Amendment itself contains no 
rules.138 At best, “probable cause” is a mere standard. Rules articulate concrete 
 
 129. See id. 
 130. See id., at 9697. 
 131. See GARY B. MELTON, JOHN PETRILA, NORMAN G. POYTHRESS & CHRISTOPHER A. 
SLOBOGIN, PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH 
PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS (2d ed. 1997); Thomas R. Litwack, Actuarial Versus Clinical 
Assessments of Dangerousness, 7 PSYCH., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 409 (2001). Schauer describes these authors 
as representative of “occasional dissenting voices.” SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 318 n.19. However, 
these voices are consistent with the most recent state of the research and are, in any event, the voices I 
find most persuasive. See CHRISTOPHER A. SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE 
PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 111, 312 n.30 (2006). 
 132. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 169, 181 (at ports of entry, in certain street-level narcotics 
offenses, and planned terrorist bombings of planes). 
 133. See HARRIS, supra note 115, at 7390. Schauer himself agrees that much racial profiling is also 
likely spurious, despite his insistence that some racial profiling is likely nonspurious. See SCHAUER, 
supra note 65, at 17781. 
 134. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 96, 17781, 18990. 
 135. See id. at 96, 17786, 18990. 
 136. See id. at 173. Schauer observes as well that the visibility of race may, on the other hand, also 
sometimes give it more salience and thus more weight than it deserves, see id. at 18889, and that there 
may sometimes be good policy reasons for excluding race as a consideration even when it is 
nonspurious. See id. at 19798. Moreover, many professionals, including police officers, can err in their 
judgments simply because of overconfidence in their accuracy and underappreciation of base rates. See 
id. at 318 n.20. 
 137. See generally SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 19501990 (1993). 
 138. The Fourth Amendment speaks in broad, grand language meant more to evoke majesty than 
effect clarity: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
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factual circumstances that activate them or that are “otherwise determinate in 
the community.”139 Standards rely on abstractions containing the underlying 
goal of the law.140 Of course, this distinction is not as sharp as it seems, for rules 
themselves come in degrees of specificity, as do standards, and it may be hard to 
judge just when the dividing line between a standard and a rule is crossed.141 
Nevertheless, the distinction is a useful and commonsense one. Legal actors 
need some sort of direction, and greater specificity increases that direction. 
Accordingly, courts over time may strive in each area of the law, where feasible, 
to shift standards closer to rules.142 Even if courts do not intend to do so, the 
mere growth of precedent addressing the application of standards to an 
increasingly diverse set of factual circumstances will be read by lawyers seeking 
guidance for clients as creating an ever more rule-like body of law.143 
Nevertheless, there are practical limits on this endeavor. No lawgivers, 
legislative, judicial, or executive, can anticipate every circumstance that may 
arise within the scope of the problem they want to address.144 Some critics also 
argue that courts especially are institutionally ill-equipped, lacking the 
investigative resources, diversity, and political sensitivity of a legislature to craft 
highly specific bodies of rules.145 Additionally, some tasks involve so much 
variation that it may be infeasible to create sufficiently specific rules to govern 
every class of conceivable circumstances.146 Even if we could do so, overly 
complex rulebooks can themselves become confusing, self-contradictory, and 
otherwise too hard to apply effectively.147 Such complexities also raise training 
 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 139. See Mark D. Rosen, Our Non-uniform Constitution: Geographical Variations of Constitutional 
Requirements in the Aid of Community, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1129, 1142 (1999). 
 140. See id. 
 141. See id. at 114243. Schauer has himself written an enlightening analysis of the rules-versus-
standards distinction. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 104 & n.35 (1991). 
 142. See Rosen, supra note 139, at 114243. 
 143. See id. at 114350. 
 144. See, e.g., ROBERT J. MARTINEAU & MICHAEL B. SALERNO, LEGAL, LEGISLATIVE, AND 
RULE DRAFTING IN PLAIN ENGLISH 79 (2005) (“When commentators speak of intentional or 
purposive ambiguity, and especially when they say it may be desirable, what they are talking about is 
vagueness, leaving it up to administrative agencies or the courts to work out the precise parameters of 
the term.”). 
 145. See, e.g., CRAIG BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION 
(1993). 
 146. Think about the problem, for example, of drafting legislation governing protecting the 
confidentiality of telephone calls in a world, not too long past, that had neither heard nor thought of 
“Skype,” which permits making phone calls via the internet. Moreover, legislation may embrace 
breadth for political reasons, even when concrete eventualities can be foreseen “as a way of glossing 
over controversies for which consensus is not reached.” MARTINEAU & SALERNO, supra note 144, at 
95. This approach is common because “the participants in the legislative process do not easily concede 
defeat and prefer to declare partial victory.” Id. 
 147. Consider the Internal Revenue Code. 
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costs. Furthermore, all rules include some things within their governance, 
excluding others, and we may fear that rules will end up inadvertently excluding 
some things that the lawgiver would want to regulate, thus undermining the 
lawgiver’s broader goals.148 Granting decisionmakers some measure of discretion 
is thus frequently unavoidable, often desirable. It once again becomes a policy 
choice about how much discretion to assign.149 
The Court has, however, generally been moving away from more rule-like 
Fourth Amendment precedent toward the more standard-like end of the 
spectrum in many of the most important areas governing police conduct.150 
Perhaps the most salient example is the Court’s overturning the Aguilar–
Spinelli rule for the determination of informant trustworthiness in making the 
decision whether there is probable cause.151 The Aguilar–Spinelli rule mandated 
that magistrates, and thus police, ignore tips that failed to survive a two-
pronged test: (1) Was there sufficient evidence of the tipster’s credibility 
(truthfulness)? (2) Was there sufficient evidence that the tipster had a reliable 
basis for his report?152 If either prong was not met, the tip could not be 
considered in the probable-cause determination. Lower courts also developed 
an extensive body of case law to guide magistrates and police concerning when 
each prong was met. The rule gave police an incentive to uncover evidence 
supporting both prongs. 
But in Illinois v. Gates,153 the Court replaced this test with a more flexible, 
standard-like, totality-of-the-circumstances test in which the two Aguilar–
Spinelli prongs became mere factors: weakness in one former prong could be 
made up by strength in the other. Any tip, no matter how weak, was at least 
relevant, in combination with other circumstances, to deciding whether 
probable cause existed.154 This more-flexible test, of course, gives the police less 
guidance but more discretion. The Gates Court at least implicitly recognized 
this consequence but embraced it, expressing fear that the previous rule was 
undermining police ability to ensure public safety because it was, or at least 
 
 148. See MARTINEAU & SALERNO, supra note 144, at 9596, 109. 
 149. See id., at 9596 (noting that legislatures may make the policy choice to leave interpretive 
discretion in, for example, the hands of administrative agencies or courts). 
 150. Indeed, leading criminal-procedure scholar Craig Bradley complained about just this problem 
in a study done some sixteen years ago. See BRADLEY, supra note 145. The Court’s continuing 
expansion of police discretion in the years since Bradley first published his book is by now largely 
undisputed. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, United States v. Whren: The Fourth Amendment Problem with 
Pretextual Traffic Stops, in WE DISSENT: TALKING BACK TO THE REHNQUIST COURT: EIGHT CASES 
THAT SUBVERTED CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS 90, 101 (Michael Avery ed., 2009) (“By 
allowing police officers to use any traffic violation as a subterfuge to conduct an arbitrary and 
unjustified narcotics investigation, the Court has given police officers across the nation virtually 
unchecked discretion to interfere with the liberty and privacy of any motorist.”). 
 151. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). 
 152. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 197200. 
 153. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
 154. See id. at 23039; ELLEN PODGOR ET AL., MASTERING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: POLICE 5258 
(2010) (explaining Gates and its reasoning and significance). 
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probably was, allowing too many bad guys to get away with their crimes.155 That 
public-safety theme has increasingly pervaded much of the Court’s other Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, leading it to expand police discretion through such 
devices as the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule,156 increasing 
deference to police expertise and professionalism,157 expanding the range of the 
weaker “reasonable suspicion” test over its probable-cause forebear,158 as well as 
expanding the number of searches permissible without any suspicion at all.159  
Whether one applauds or derides this trend, the idea that police face varied 
circumstances, often needing to act quickly and decisively, sometimes doing so 
to avert grave danger, does suggest that police must unavoidably retain some 
level of discretion in their jobs.160 A computer-like set of “if–then” rules for all 
police conduct is neither feasible nor wise.161 The initial question, therefore, is 
how much discretion to give them, not whether to do so at all. Even under the 
Aguilar–Spinelli rule, police had significant discretion to act in a wide range of 
situations, so long as they paid attention in their investigations to both prongs in 
the analysis.162 Moreover, it is perfectly feasible to give police “guidelines,” 
presumptive rules that can be ignored if the police have good, case-specific 
reasons to do so.163 That constrains, without handcuffing, police discretion. A 
 
 155. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 23738; PODGOR ET AL., supra note 154, at 5258. 
 156. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009). 
 157. See supra notes 5456 and accompanying text. 
 158. See supra notes 5254 and accompanying text. 
 159. See supra notes 3541 and accompanying text. 
 160. Certainly this is the view of many officers, who “feel that their job is so difficult, so dangerous, 
and so singular that no one who does not also wear the uniform can possibly understand it and that no 
civilian should sit in judgment of the actions of a police officer.” DAVID A. HARRIS, GOOD COPS: THE 
CASE FOR PREVENTIVE POLICING 86–87 (2005). This distrust of civilians is, I believe, fundamentally 
misplaced. See SAMUEL WALKER, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 8 (2005) (“It is a 
basic principle of a democratic society that the police should be answerable to the public.”). Yet, as a 
descriptive matter, police do retain, and will vigorously defend, ample discretion. See HARRIS, supra, at 
131 (“Most officers do nearly all their work unsupervised, only sporadically reporting in to their 
sergeants or dispatchers and only rarely encountering a supervisory officer on the street.”). Continues 
Harris, “Anything that intrudes on officer autonomya policy or directive from the precinct 
commander or headquarters, a new law, or a court decisionbecomes a bone in the throat of the rank-
and-file officer.” Id. at 13132. As a normative matter, the police’s retaining significant discretion is 
probably a wise thing so long as it is supplemented with mechanisms for guiding that discretion and 
holding police accountable for its proper exercise. See generally WALKER, supra. 
 161. See HARRIS, supra note 160, at 94 (“There is still ‘no substitute for judgment. You must be 
engaged as a supervisor’ with your officers. If you are . . . you’ll be able to tell which officers with 
higher-than-average arrests or searches and seizures are doing their jobs properly and which ones are 
not.”) (quoting Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Police Commander Linda Barone). 
 162. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 18586, 197200 (describing the many 
flexible factors to be weighed in deciding whether each Aguilar–Spinelli prong has been met). 
 163. See HARRIS, supra note 160, at 94 (“The aim is not to command but to guide generally.”). 
Harris elaborates, 
Departmental policies crafted by members of the police department for members of the police 
department have almost automatic legitimacy among the rank and file who must obey them. 
They are more likely to be implemented, and more likely to be followed (even when 
unpopular) than pronouncements on police behavior that come from other institutions, such 
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still-looser approach does not make guidelines presumptive minima for 
constitutional behavior, but at least hints to police how they can attain “safe 
harbors” by structuring what sorts of things they should think about as they do 
their work.164 Arguably, that is just what Gates does by retaining a reminder to 
police to investigate and consider all the same evidentiary factors they 
considered under Aguilar–Spinelli, while giving police greater deference should 
those efforts prove partly unavailing.165 How much discretion to allow police is a 
question whose answer depends upon factors that are partly normative (What 
do constitutional values demand?), partly empirical (Which approach, Aguilar–
Spinelli or Gates, creates stronger incentives for police to do a “better job,” 
however we define it?). On the normative front, some scholars argue that the 
central purpose of the Fourth Amendment was aggressively to restrain law-
enforcement discretion,166 while others disagree.167 On the empirical front, 
disagreement seems to reign as well.168 
3. The Problem of Imperfect Knowledge 
The problem of imperfect knowledge complicates things still further.169 As 
Schauer points out, even particularist approaches are not based upon perfect 
 
as courts or legislative bodies. That is why formal departmental policies concerning 
accountability and other aspects of preventive policing are essential. Policies describe the 
contours of proper conduct by setting out the general parameters of how police officers should 
respond to situations they face repeatedly. 
Id. at 94; cf. WALKER, supra note 160, at 31 (noting that court decisions, especially those rooted in 
constitutional law, can have only a limited impact on police behavior, partly because “so many critical 
aspects of routine policing fall outside the purview of any court decision defining constitutional 
standards,” and that, when they do fall within constitutional law’s purview, the Court “lacks the 
institutional capacity to ensure compliance with its own decisions on a day-to-day basis”). This does not 
mean, of course, that constitutional law decisions have no impact on police, but it does suggest that the 
Court is well-advised to craft a regulatory scheme that creates incentives for other institutions to join in 
the process of implementation. See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Expressive Fourth Amendment: Rethinking 
the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 76 MISS. L.J. 483 (2009) (illustrating one such 
scheme). 
 164. See Taslitz, Expressive Fourth Amendment, supra note 163, at 55275. 
 165. See PODGOR ET. AL., supra, note 154, at 2127. 
 166. See Maclin, supra note 150, at 101 (“History shows that the Framers believed that the best way 
to guard against arbitrary and unjustified governmental intrusions was to control the discretion of law 
enforcement officers.”). 
 167. See Fabio Arcila Jr., In the Trenches: Searches and the Misunderstood Common-Law History of 
Suspicion and Probable Cause, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (2007) (arguing that magistrates during the 
post-Revolutionary and immediate post–Fourth Amendment periods largely deferred to law-
enforcement judgments concerning probable cause). 
 168. Compare WALKER, supra note 160, at 4951 (arguing that the Court’s modern Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence has done much to professionalize police departments), with Thomas Y. 
Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (And Still Need to Learn) About the “Costs” of the 
Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of “Lost” Arrests, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611 
(1983) (summarizing studies, including those critical of the exclusionary rule). 
 169. See RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 
125 (2000) (explaining the pervasive problem of imperfect knowledge and the frequent superiority of 
“local knowledge”). 
TASLITZ 12/22/2010  3:32:52 PM 
Summer 2010]     WHAT IS PROBABLE CAUSE, AND WHY SHOULD WE CARE? 169 
knowledge.170 We cannot know everything about another person or the situation 
facing him. Moreover, police always face some time limits on their decisions—
often tight limits.171 As a practical matter, police can obtain only so much 
information about a suspect in a reasonable period of time. Imperfect 
knowledge may increase error rates, perhaps at times beyond the error rates 
involved in actuarial reasoning.172 
This criticism seems overstated. First, it is rare that the police have 
nonspurious generalizations upon which to rely.173 Perhaps the march of social 
science will change that one day,174 but police are largely stuck relying on their 
common sense, experience, training, and guidelines from superiors. When 
adequate empirical evidence is available, all four of these sources for police 
decisionmaking may be improved. But otherwise, proven nonspurious actuarial 
reasoning just is not an option for most police probable-cause decisions. 
The statement that proven nonspurious actuarial reasoning is not an option 
rests on two assumptions, both partly normative, the latter also partly empirical: 
first, that the burden of proving “nonspuriousness” should be on the state, and 
second, that proving nonspuriousness requires a sufficient body of sound social-
science data. But this proof cannot rest alone on police or lay experience or on 
common sense. These are two assumptions that Schauer implicitly supports by 
defining spurious generalizations as those “devoid of . . . empirical 
foundations.”175 These assumptions also follow from the position to be defended 
below that individualized suspicion is one important way for the state to justify 
invading individuals’ privacy, property, and locomotive rights that must 
otherwise be inviolate.176 In short, there is a “presumption of liberty.”177 A 
 
 170. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 10304. 
 171. See HARRIS, supra note 160, at 95, 156 (discussing high-speed chases, “[c]hasing crooks,” and 
responding to 911 emergencies as among the standard tasks of policing). 
 172. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 10304. 
 173. Here I am talking specifically about such generalizations’ being used in making judgments 
about probable cause or reasonable suspicion. “Profiles” are often touted as introducing science into 
the probable-cause and reasonable-suspicion decisions, but in practice, few profiles have empirical 
support, and most leave police with unfettered discretion while creating the false impression of the 
opposite. See, e.g., TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 35360; Sharon L. Davies, Profiling 
Terror, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 45 (2003). 
 174. In areas of policing outside the Fourth Amendment, such as eyewitness identifications and 
interrogations, empirical data supporting nonspurious generalizations is already slowly starting to 
improve police investigative practices. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ACHIEVING JUSTICE: 
FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUILTY: REPORT OF THE ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SECTION’S AD HOC INNOCENCE COMMITTEE TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF THE CRIMINAL 
PROCESS (2006). Although these areas are generally governed by the due-process clauses and the Fifth 
Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination, the results of these procedures can, of course, help to 
establish probable cause by providing evidence of the wrongdoer’s identity. See TASLITZ, PARIS & 
HERBERT, supra note 35, at 71015, 86976. Some empirically supported, nonspurious generalizations 
may thus be available to aid police in the individualized-suspicion judgment in those jurisdictions that 
have fully adopted the new investigative techniques and best practices dictated by these recent 
developments in cognitive psychology. 
 175. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 7. 
 176. See infra text accompanying notes 293332. 
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lawyer rejecting either or both of these assumptions might also reject my 
conclusion (that valid actuarial reasoning thus far is rarely a police option in the 
probable-cause area). Schauer himself tries to argue that police profiling is at 
least one area in which adequate scientific evidence sometimes supports 
actuarial reasoning.178 This may be true of some profiles, but simply is not true 
for most profiles used in everyday policing.179 
Yet even if actuarial reasoning in this area can wisely be given a wider 
scope, that cannot eliminate particularistic police judgments. All legal rules 
must be applied to facts. Historical “raw” facts, like “Did Jake punch Charley 
or did someone else do so?” have indisputably true either–or answers.180 But 
since we lack time machines, we face grave challenges in finding those facts.181 
Other facts, such as whether an alleged offender in a homicide case acted in 
cold blood or in self-defense, contain a more interpretive component, making 
fact-finding still harder.182 Furthermore, fact-finding requires credibility 
judgments whenever stories conflict and sufficiency of evidence judgments, 
whatever the standard for “sufficient” may be.183 Fact-finders thus exercise 
judgment in a way that vests them with enormous discretion.184 But in law 
enforcement, it is the police who are, in the first instance, the fact-finders. They 
must decide whether they have enough credible evidence that this individual 
has committed a particular crime to whatever standard of proof controls if they 
are to have probable cause.185 Even in a Schauerian world, therefore, the 
problems of police discretion and of the accuracy of police judgment cannot be 
eliminated. 
If the criminal-procedure provisions of the Bill of Rights as a whole, or the 
Fourth Amendment itself, express distrust of unconstrained law-enforcement 
discretion,186 and if actuarial approaches, even nonspurious ones, cannot fully do 
that job,187 then other approaches must be found. Such approaches could aim to 
improve the quantity and quality of police deliberation (and we do have good 
social science available about how to minimize the downsides of deliberation, 
 
 177. See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004). 
 178. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 3, 6, 22, 68, 126, 15598. 
 179. See sources cited supra note 173. 
 180. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Proving the Unprovable, 22 CRIM. JUST. 70, 7076 (2007) (reviewing 
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE UNPROVABLE: THE ROLE OF LAW, SCIENCE, AND 
SPECULATION IN ADJUDICATING CULPABILITY AND DANGEROUSNESS (2007)) [hereinafter 
Unprovable]; Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Approach to Social Science Evidence: Foundations, 5 
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, (1998) (providing philosophical support for Slobogin’s position) [hereinafter 
A Feminist Approach]. 
 181. See Taslitz, Unprovable, supra note 180. 
 182. See Taslitz, A Feminist Approach, supra note 180, at 1346. 
 183. See id. at 3738 & n.170. 
 184. See id. at 4957. 
 185. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 196. 
 186. See Maclin, supra note 4, at 411. 
 187. See supra text accompanying notes 128-31. 
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which can be many),188 as well as increasing the transparency and accountability 
of police decisions and actions.189 Furthermore, if part of our concern about 
police is that they act upon imperfect information, we can give them incentives 
to collect more of the reasonably available information before acting.190 
Probable cause partly embodies just these approaches to constraining police 
discretion.191 
4. Countervailing Policy Concerns, Even for Nonspurious Generalizations 
Furthermore, as I noted earlier, Schauer himself recognizes that even when 
nonspurious generalizations are likely to be more accurate than particularistic 
judgments, there may be good policy reasons to reject actuarial reasoning.192 
Some generalizations may, for example, add to the social stigma of historically 
disempowered groups.193 Other generalizations might be mere masks for hostile 
motives.194 Though Schauer does not mention them, generalizations can also 
become self-fulfilling prophecies, changing social reality, rather than reflecting 
it.195 
Schauer also argues that we must sometimes replace a socially injurious 
generalization with a compensatory generalization, rather than a particularistic 
one, to adequately repair the injury done.196 For example, gender law might 
mandate that, unless shown otherwise on a fair test applicable to both sexes, all 
women must be presumed to have the same upper-body strength as men for 
employment purposes.197 That is likely a false generalization, but it creates an 
opportunity for those women who can do the job while compensating for a 
history of exaggerating the quantity of upper-body strength needed, as well as a 
history of failing to assess women’s true body strength—both factors having 
been used as excuses simply to keep women out of the best-paying jobs.198 Such 
compensating generalizations may thus in fact promote more-individualized 
 
 188. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Eyewitness Identification, Democratic Deliberation, and the Politics of 
Science, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y, & ETHICS J. 271, 296323 (2006) (discussing the social science on 
good deliberation in most contexts, though applying it to prosecutors). 
 189. See id. at 284. Rather than repeat here the detailed supporting analyses of deliberation, 
transparency, and accountability that I have done elsewhere, see, e.g., id. at 296323; Andrew E. Taslitz, 
Racial Auditors and the Fourth Amendment: Data with the Power to Inspire Political Action, 66 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 221 (Summer 2003), I have interwoven discussion of these benefits into this article’s 
larger discussions of other social advantages of an individualized-suspicion requirement. See infra II–
IV. 
 190. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Police are People Too: Cognitive Obstacles to Police Getting the 
Individualized Suspicion Judgment Right, OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2010). 
 191. Id. 
 192. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 2223. 
 193. See id. at 2223, 3536, 139, 15054, 186, 199200, 21723. 
 194. See id. at 144. 
 195. See infra text accompanying notes 26283. 
 196. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 151. 
 197. See id. at 143, 14754. 
 198. See id. 
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judgments by compelling employers either to accept that all women can 
presumptively do the job or to individually test both all women and all men to 
weed out those who truly cannot.199 
Schauer makes one important final concession: even though most reasoning 
is to one degree or another probabilistic, there is less justification for reliance 
on predominantly probabilistic generalization in criminal cases than civil 
cases.200 Given unavoidable uncertainty in virtually all decisionmaking, decision 
theorists argue for the concept of discounting outcomes by the probability that 
they are mistaken.201 In mathematical terms, this means multiplying the outcome 
by the probability that it is right.202 Yet law generally makes dichotomous 
decisionsplaintiff wins or losesrather than allow for probabilistic 
discounting.203 Schauer bemoans this limitation in most civil cases but lauds it in 
criminal cases.204 Thus, he explains, in criminal cases in which there is only a 
seventy-percent likelihood of guilt, “even statisticians” would feel discomfort 
over a guilty verdict.205 That discomfort stems from the high value our society 
places on liberty and the consequent gravity of the error in convicting the 
innocent.206 More simply put, to convict an offender but discount his sentence by 
the thirty-percent chance of error is intolerable. For this reason, the principle of 
expected value is “properly a stranger to the criminal law.”207 Given that 
searches and arrests start the criminal process and carry a stigma in many 
contexts merely for one’s being suspected of crime,208 Schauer’s caution should 
be taken to heart in the probable-cause determination as well. 
 
 199. See id. Schauer also makes a political argument in favor of certain generalizations. Specifically, 
he insists that a political communitya nationby definition requires emphasizing generality, namely 
of shared constitutional norms, goals, and valuesover difference and particularity. See id. at 278300. 
On this point Schauer is partly right (though I see both commonality and difference as essential to 
nationhood and the supporting system of rights). See Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth 
Amendment, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 7080 (2003). 
 200. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 89. 
 201. See id. at 8793. 
 202. See id. at 8788. 
 203. See id. at 90. 
 204. See id. at 8789. 
 205. See id. at 89. 
 206. See id. See also BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT (Larry King ed., 2006) (collecting essays, 
many of which argue that this anti–expected-value principle underlies the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
burden of persuasion in criminal cases). 
 207. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 89. 
 208. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux: How Race Contributes to Convicting the 
Innocent: The Informants Example, 27 SW. U.L. REV. 1076 (2009). 
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III 
THE BENEFITS OF INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION 
The major social benefits of individualized suspicionparticularly those 
involving questions of political morality209derive from making such suspicion a 
prerequisite to invasive police action. An exploration of these social benefits 
might begin with an examination of procedural and distributive fairness in the 
context of “fair price theory.” 
A.  Fairness 
1. Terminology and the Relevance of Fair-Price Theory 
Individualized suspicion, particularly in the form of probable cause, 
promotes fairness. The terms “fairness” and “justice” are often used 
interchangeably210 and are so used here, for joining in the debate over whether 
there is a logical distinction between the two terms does little to clarify my 
argument. By “fairness,” I mean here either being treated in a satisfactory 
fashionone meeting expectationsor in a just fashion, that is, a fashion that is 
justified, meaning that the treatment is done for good reasons, “free of 
favoritism or bias; impartial . . . just to all parties; equitable . . . consistent with 
rules, logic or ethics.”211 This notion of fairness is rooted in social norms, the 
“consensual rules of a society.”212 
The first class of social-fairness norms—those involving perceived 
satisfactory treatment—are sometimes labeled personal-fairness norms, with the 
second class (involving “just” treatment) being labeled social-fairness norms.213 
Violations of social-fairness norms produce far more-intense emotional 
reactions than violation of personal-fairness norms,214 and the former is stressed 
here. 
 
 209. By “political morality” I mean those moral principles governing how the state should treat its 
citizens and vice versa. Such principles are normative, are implicit in much constitutional interpretation, 
and bring with them many practical benefits that flow from enhanced governmental legitimacy. See 
generally Taslitz, Respect, supra note 199 (exploring how such principles operate in interpreting the 
Fourth Amendment). I distinguish the benefits of political morality from another important class of 
benefitsthose enhancing the accuracy of police judgments. This latter class of benefits I have touched 
on thus far and will do so repeatedly again here, but a fuller exploration of them may be found at 
Taslitz, Police are People Too, supra note 190. 
 210. See NORMAN J. FINKEL, NOT FAIR: THE TYPOLOGY OF COMMONSENSE UNFAIRNESS 4358 
(2001). 
 211. See, e.g., SARAH MAXWELL, THE PRICE IS WRONG: UNDERSTANDING WHAT MAKES A 
PRICE SEEM FAIR AND THE TRUE COST OF UNFAIR PRICING 67 (2008). 
 212. See MAXWELL, supra note 211, at 7. For fuller explanations of the meaning of “social 
norms”itself a contested conceptsee ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18 (2000). See 
also Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp, Introduction, in SOCIAL NORMS xi, xiii (Michael Hechter & 
Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 2001) (“As there is no common definition of social norms, there can be little 
agreement about how to measure them.”). 
 213. See MAXWELL, supra note 211, at 7. 
 214. See id. at 9. 
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Social-fairness norms themselves come in two types relevant to this 
discussion: “distributive fairness,” or the fairness of outcomes, and “procedural 
fairness,” or the fairness of the process by which the outcomes are achieved.215 
Analyzing the application of these concepts to probable cause here draws on 
political philosophy and two related strands of social science: the psychology of 
substantive (distributive) and procedural justice and the economics of fair 
pricing.216 The latter strand’s applicability might not be self-evident but turns on 
analogies to markets and to the idea of a social contract.217 Many social-contract 
theories turn on the idea that individuals join in a society to protect themselves 
from the violence they might do to one another.218 Society in turn delegates 
enforcement of the rules that prevent such violence to the state.219 However, the 
police are the everyday arm of the state, wielding authority to threaten or use 
force to maintain order.220 The state, and thus the police, must in turn be 
restrained to prevent state violence from becoming a form of oppression akin to 
that in the war of all against all—a war for whose avoidance the state was 
originally formed.221 
As with any contract, each party must give up something to gain something 
else.222 Each ordinary citizen can thus in a sense be viewed, from one 
perspective, as a “buyer” of police services to provide social order and 
stability.223 The price paid by each citizen to the state in exchange for such order 
includes, but is not limited to, taxes.224 The price also includes exposing one’s 
self to the risk of facing restraints on one’s privacy, liberty, and property by the 
police under certain circumstances.225 When those risks become realizedfor 
example, when the police stop a citizen on the street for brief questioning (a 
“Terry stop”),226 the price that individual pays has risen; now it is not merely the 
 
 215. See id. at 26. 
 216. On fair-pricing economics generally, see MAXWELL, supra note 211, summarizing the major 
findings in the field. On the psychology of fairness generally, see HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH 
IN LAW (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds. 2001). 
 217. For a summary of market-based thinking, see CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, THE MARKET SYSTEM: 
WHAT IT IS, HOW IT WORKS, AND WHAT TO MAKE OF IT (2002). For a summary of social-contract–
based thinking, see Andrew E. Taslitz, Plugging into the Fourth Amendment’s Matrix, 22 CRIM. JUST. 
26, 2729 (2007). 
 218. See TASLITZ, supra note 4, at 3. 
 219. See id. 
 220. See id. at 34, 79, 24344, 261. 
 221. See id. 
 222. This idea is embodied in ordinary contract law in the term “consideration.” See Peter A. Alces, 
Suretyship and the Statute of Frauds, ch. 4, in THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 4:2 (2007). 
 223. Cf. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 208 (1995) (describing prosecutors as buyers and 
defense counsel as sellers in a “market for plea bargains”). 
 224. See generally STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY 
DEPENDS ON TAXES (1999) (defending the theory that taxes are the necessary price for citizenship). 
 225. Law-and-economics scholars will readily understand the idea that risks and lost opportunities, 
including to exercise rights, can be understood as costs. See WILLIAM D. ROHLF, INTRODUCTION TO 
ECONOMIC REASONING (6th ed. 2005). 
 226. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 317, 33253 (explaining Terry stops). 
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risk but the reality of lost liberties that that individual incurs. To accept that 
added price as legitimate, the person stopped must see the price he pays as fair. 
What factors affect that perception is the subject of fair-price theory.  
2. Procedural Fairness 
There are three core aspects to whether a buyer sees a price as procedurally 
fair: (1) voice and choice, (2) transparency, and (3) impartiality.227 
a. Voice and choice. “Voice and choice” means that the buyer sees the 
pricing process as controllable, at least in the sense of having input (“voice”) 
into how the price is set.228 One goal of negotiation can be to give the buyer 
precisely such input and control.229 However, often there is little, if any, room for 
direct negotiation.230 For example, the price of canned beans in a supermarket is 
usually fixed, the same for all buyers.231 Even when this is true, however, 
“choice” can give “voice.” If the buyer is free to buy cheaper beans elsewhere, 
the buyer can do so, thus sending the message to the more-expensive bean 
retailer, “Bring down the price, or I will never buy from you again.”232 If all bean 
sellers charge equal prices but offer different-quality beans, buying the better 
beans likewise sends the message to the seller of poor-quality beans, “Do better 
or lose my business.” If all beans are expensive and poor quality, the buyer can 
forego beans entirely, spending her money on a different product in protest 
against the entire bean business.233 
But a person stopped by an officer and sent the message that he is not free 
to leave (the very definition of a Terry stop)234 has at that moment no choice. He 
must do as the officer says and, short of moving out of the jurisdictionan 
unlikely and high-transaction-cost option235cannot employ a different officer 
or set of officers to provide public safety. Nor, so long as he resides in America, 
can he forego entirely the benefits and burdens of having police in the first 
 
 227. See MAXWELL, supra note 211, at 7374. 
 228. See id. at 7677. 
 229. See id. 
 230. For a discussion of the benefits of direct means of expressing voice via the legal system 
whenever feasible, see TASLITZ,  supra note 84, at 13451. 
 231. See MAXWELL, supra note 211, at 76 (making a similar point but using college textbooks as an 
example). 
 232. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN 
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970) (exploring when economic actors choose “exit” and 
when “voice” to get what they want and the connection between the two options). 
 233. See ROBERT PINDYCK & DANIEL RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 10230, 27779 (7th ed. 
2008). 
 234. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 33242. 
 235. See DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW’S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO DO WITH LAW AND 
WHY IT MATTERS 26, 36, 3944, 49, 5460, 16364 (2001) (defining “transaction costs” and explaining 
their significance). 
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place.236 Likewise, he may try to “negotiate” his freedom or silence with the 
officer, but he is largely at the officer’s mercy.237 The contract here is one of 
adhesion.238 
Probable cause, however, potentially gives the citizen some measure of 
control over whether he must pay the price of actually being stopped. Because 
the officer needs individualized suspicion, he cannot stop persons randomly. 
Rather, he must have good reason to believe that this person has committed, or 
is about to commit, a crime.239 By refraining from criminal conduct or from 
actions that can be expected to raise suspicions of such conduct, the citizen 
gains some control over whether he will pay the added price for social safety 
and security of in fact being stopped by the police.240 The Court has, of course, 
sanctioned stops on less than probable causeon mere reasonable suspicion.241 
But because that lesser standard theoretically retains an individualized-
suspicion requirement, hopefully a robust one, the citizen still retains significant 
control over the size of the risk that his liberties will be infringed by the police. 
Probable cause and reasonable suspicion thus help to protect citizen autonomy. 
This protection will, of course, be imperfect. But imperfection does not 
render the protection valueless. Moreover, if a citizen believes that police 
generally do their best to adhere to the individualized-suspicion mandate, he 
will likely be eager to cooperate when stopped, assuming that answering the 
officer’s questions will readily dissolve any mistaken suspicions.242 If the 
suspicions nevertheless persist, a citizen who has done all he reasonably can to 
avoid crime and suspicions of it will rightly expect an explanation, and a truly 
 
 236. This observation is true as a practical matter and as part of the American social contract. See 
TASLITZ, supra note 4, at 44, 79, 24361 (explaining the role of the police in the American social 
contract). 
 237. See, e.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177 (2004) (upholding under the Fourth 
Amendment Hiibel’s arrest for failing to reveal his name to an officer upon request); Maryland v. 
Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003) (upholding arrest for drug possession when cocaine was found hidden 
behind an upraised armrest in the back seat next to the back-seat passenger, but when there was no 
evidence that Pringle, the front-seat passenger, knew of the cocaine’s presence and when the officer 
threatened to arrest all three of the car’s occupants unless someone confessed). 
 238. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 342 (8th ed. 2004) (defining an “adhesion contract” as one to 
which a “consumer . . . adheres . . . with little choice about the terms”). 
 239. There can be “anticipatory” probable causeprobable cause to believe that someone will 
commit a crime in the future. See United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90 (2006) (recognizing anticipatory 
probable cause and articulating a test for when it has been met); see also TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, 
supra note 35, at 26569. 
 240. See Jed Rubenfeld, Privacy’s End, in LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN THE EMPIRE OF FORCE 207, 
21518 (H. Jefferson Powell & James Boyd White eds., 2009) (making a similar argument for the 
autonomy-enhancing advantages of individualized suspicion). 
 241. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 242. See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC 
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS xiiixvi, 4, 5457, 8284, 101, 10607 (2002) 
(procedural justice and resulting enhanced governmental legitimacy both contribute to “acceptance,” 
that is, to voluntary obedience to law); Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the 
Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153 (2002) (summarizing empirical data demonstrating 
that people are likely to readily bow to police officer “requests” to consent to a search). 
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sound system of criminal justice would presumptively compel the officer to do 
so.243 If, however, a citizen has sound reason to believe that he is stopped for 
what category of person he isa generalization, such as one based on race, 
ethnicity, or style of speech or dressrather than for what he has done, he will 
lose any sense that he ever had serious control over the risk of facing police 
interference in his life.244 Nor will he believe that he has any voice concerning 
the price he must pay. The price he pays for social stability will, therefore, no 
longer seem fair.245 
b. Transparency. “Transparency” means that the price-setting process is 
open, rational, and understandable.246 Ideally, that openness would precede or 
coincide with payment of the price.247 But even delayed transparency is better 
than none.248 By linking individualized suspicion to publicly open and available 
remedies, the law ensures that the searched or seized citizen will receive at least 
a delayed, and sometimes a coinciding, explanation for police action. Thus, if 
police execute a search warrant, local rules and practices generally require that 
the subject of the search be served a copy of the warrant and the supporting 
affidavitwhich sets forth the reasons for suspecting the individualat the 
time of the search.249 Moreover, whether or not this occurs, the person searched 
can later obtain the affidavit if accused of a crime or if bringing civil suit against 
 
 243. See TYLER & HUO, supra note 242, at 70, 202 (explaining that understanding why police 
officers act as they do promotes motive-based trust, and that stop-and-frisks are perceived as fair when 
officers give credible reasons for their actions and avoid demeaning the person stopped). 
 244. See id. at 85–86, 163. 
 245. See Tom R. Tyler, Racial Profiling, Attributions of Motive, and the Acceptance of Social 
Authority, in SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN LEGAL DECISIONMAKING: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 
6466, 7071 (Richard L. Wiener et al. eds., 2007) (policing decisions seen as unfair because they lack 
neutrality, consistency, factuality, or dignity, increasing disobedience to law and cooperation with the 
police). 
 246. See MAXWELL, supra note 211, at 7778. 
 247. See id. 
 248. Transparency’s benefits extend beyond promoting perceptions of procedural justice, as law 
professor David Harris explains: 
Without transparencyinstitutional openness to public scrutinyreal accountability cannot 
exist, and the lifeblood of transparency is the wide dissemination of information. A 
government agency that functions in the shadows, without public oversight, is an open 
invitation for abuse. The more crucial the agency’s mission and the greater its powers, the 
graver the danger posed by a lack of transparency. Police departments have always resisted 
this idea, but what will probably most surprise those who work in policing is that 
disseminating information about their performance can benefit themin very substantial 
ways. 
HARRIS, supra note 160, at 11819. The benefits for the police include error reduction and enhanced 
community cooperation. See id. at 11920; see also Taslitz, supra note 189, at 28494 (explaining how 
transparency promotes a more “honor-based” police organizational culture); Taslitz, supra note 188, at 
284 (explaining that transparency is a prerequisite to accountability); see generally Erik Luna, 
Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107 (2000) (extolling the virtues of widespread police 
transparency). 
 249. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. 
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the police.250 Affidavits are usually written by the police themselves, less often 
by prosecutors, in ways that may be readily understandable to many, if not 
necessarily most, laypeople.251 In a criminal case, the right to counsel also 
ensures the availability of a lawyer to explain the affidavit’s meaning.252 
Furthermore, even for warrantless searches and seizures (indeed, for all 
searches and seizures) in criminal cases, the availability of the suppression 
hearing, at which the officer’s testimony is taken, requires the state to explain 
its actions.253 Lawyers again stand ready via cross-examination to prod evasive 
or ambiguous witnesses into clarifying matters.254 Transparency similarly 
promotes accountability because officers and the state face consequences if the 
reasons they give are poor or perjurious.255 
c. Impartiality. “Impartiality” is the idea that the process of decision 
should be impersonal and unbiased.256 A related, though not identical, idea is 
that persons expect decisionmakers, even when they have the power to inflict 
punishment on the persons before them, to act with care and concern for those 
persons, at least in the sense of treating them in a respectful manner, showing 
concern for their rights, and being committed to making an accurate decision, 
reached fairly.257 That expectation likewise includes the sense of entitlement to 
an honest, factual, evidence-based procedure and outcome.258 
The objective nature of the probable-cause or reasonable-suspicion decision 
turns on what a “reasonable” police officer has a right to believe.259 Surely, no 
court would openly describe as “reasonable” an officer’s beliefs that are based 
on bias toward a particular group, a venal desire to harm members of that 
group, or a complete lack of serious or apparently accurate evidence linking the 
 
 250. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16, 41. 
 251. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 23738 (explaining the warrant application 
process); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a) (declaring that a law-enforcement officer or the attorney for the 
government are authorized to prepare a warrant affidavit). 
 252. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies at all “critical stages” after formal adversarial 
proceedings have begun. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 869, 88587 (supporting 
this proposition and illustrating the active role defense counsel can play at suppression hearings). 
 253. See id. at 226 (noting that for most suppression issues involving warrantless searches or 
seizures, the prosecution has the burden of proof; failing to meet it with evidence and arguments results 
in the prosecution’s losing the motion). 
 254. See id. at 75051 (illustrating the process of impeachment at suppression hearings). 
 255. Unconvincing reasons or incredible stories will lead to loss of the suppression motion, including 
not only exclusion of the evidence wrongly seized but also likely to include any evidence obtained as 
the poisonous “fruit” of that tainted constitutional tree. See id. at 226. Police lies under oath at such 
hearings can result in perjury prosecutions. See Christopher Slobogin, Testifying: Police Perjury and 
What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037 (1996). 
 256. See MAXWELL, supra note 211, at 7980. 
 257. See TYLER & HUO, supra note 242, at 58, 80, 83, 163. 
 258. See id. at 16263. 
 259. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 19495. 
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specific individual stopped to a specific crime or attempt.260 Nor could an 
officer’s beliefs about an individual’s past or impending behavior be deemed 
“reasonable” if based on assumptions or conjecture.261 The individualized-
suspicion requirement, properly understood, thus helps to promote perceived 
and actual police impartiality. 
3. Distributive Fairness 
Distributive fairness likewise has at least three core aspects: first, “equity”—
the idea that the price charged should reflect the worth of the product (you 
should “get what you pay for”); second, “equality”—the notion that everyone 
should be charged the same price; and third, “need”—the recognition that the 
price should be adjusted for the disadvantaged.262 These three aspects of 
distributive fairness are, however, closely related. 
a. Equity. In the criminal-justice system, equity means in part that the 
price each citizen pays for the safety of her person or property must be worth 
the resulting benefit in crime reduction.263 Yet there is reason to believe that 
undue reliance on generalizations will often increase, rather than decrease, 
crime. 
Take a simple example. Suppose that the police correctly believe that a 
group of persons with characteristic A is more likely than those with 
characteristic B to commit a certain class of serious crime.264 Accordingly, police 
start investigating, stopping, and arresting mostly As. In a static, unchanging 
world, that approach would reduce serious crime. But in the real, dynamic 
world, Bs may learn that police are focusing their resources primarily, or even 
entirely, on As. Bs will no longer fear police capture, thus becoming more 
willing to engage in the serious criminal activity from which they previously 
 
 260. On the other hand, while not labeling such actions and motivations “reasonable”indeed 
condemning them, as in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 1415, 22 (1968)the Court has held that officers’ 
subjective motivations are irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness question. See TASLITZ, 
PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 47678; Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). But see 
Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333 (1998) (condemning the 
Court’s reasoning in Whren and explaining how officer motivations can fit into an “objective” inquiry). 
Still, the Court is likely to view, at least in its public pronouncements, “reasonable” officer beliefs or 
actions as those informed by the evidence fairly evaluated by an officer untainted by racial hatred or 
stereotypes—in short, to embrace the ideal of officer impartiality. 
 261. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 196200 (probable cause and reasonable 
suspicion must be based on trustworthy evidence rather than on speculation or unarticulated hunches). 
My argument here, of course, turns on both the existence of an individualized-suspicion mandate and 
the availability of a serious remedy for that mandate, matters determined in a public proceeding. I 
accordingly see the individualized-suspicion concept’s social value as inseparably linked to the 
availability of remedies via sound adjudicative processes. To gut the remedies or their related processes 
is thus to simultaneously gut individualized suspicion of much of its meaning and value. 
 262. See MAXWELL, supra note 211, at 7374. 
 263. See id. 
 264. This example is a variation on examples, rooted in empirical data and social and economic 
theory, in BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING 
IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 2226, 12939 (2007). 
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refrained. If there are equal numbers of As and Bs in a society, and if Bs now 
start committing this class of serious crime at a higher rate than did As, then the 
total serious crime in society rises. 
Alternatively, if the Bs’ new rate of serious criminality is equal to or 
somewhat smaller than the As’ previous rate but Bs are a significantly larger 
group than As, then the total crime in society will again rise. Of course, by 
police’s focusing on As, perhaps even imprisoning them, incapacitation effects 
might reduce the rate at which As commit serious crime. Whether public safety 
benefits overall turns partly on whether the total fall in absolute numbers of this 
crime committed by As exceeds the total rise in absolute numbers of this crime 
committed by Bs. Another aspect of this cost-benefit reasoning is whether the 
enormous added costs in building prisons, supervising parolees, and addressing 
recidivists whose long incarceration has made it hard for them to function in the 
free world are worth the benefits. There is strong reason to believe that they are 
not265especially because alternative methods of crime prevention may very 
well have done better in cost-benefit terms than has mass incapacitation.266 
The general characteristics most likely to affect arrest and search rates are 
race and class.267 Assume, therefore, that the As are African Americans with low 
incomes and the Bs are Whites with at least modestly higher incomes. The 
 
 265.  
[T]he ordinary incapacitation effects are likely to be relatively small. Generally, they will be 
washed out by the effect of any change in offending: there is no incapacitation effect if you 
imprison a recidivist versus an ordinary citizen once the rates of offending have equalized. But 
what if the offending rates do not equalize? What if offenders are entirely irrational and 
completely unresponsive to policing? 
Id. at 28. 
 266. See id. at 2728 (suggesting that the resources spent on mass incarceration could have been 
“better spent on other crime-fighting practices, such as increased police presence, more drug-treatment 
programs, free abortions, mandatory military conscription, or other policies”). 
 267. A recent report on quality-of-life policing in New York City made this point starkly: 
The most recent NYPD data confirms that the police disproportionately target New Yorkers 
of color for stops and frisks. In 2006 alone, the NYPD stopped, questioned, or frisked over 
508,540 people, a 500% percent increase over the previous year. Over 80% of those stopped 
and frisked were Black or Latino (or Latina), even though these groups make up only 53.6% 
of the NYC population. Only 10% of stops led to summonses or arrests, thereby undermining 
any claim that racial disparities in stops and frisks are the result of differential rates of 
involvement in criminal activity rather than race-based policing practices. The numbers of 
stops are increasing, as well. 
Marc Krupanski, Andrea Ritchie, Justice Committee & People’s Justice, Backgrounder on Racial 
Profiling and Police Brutality Against People of Color in New York City Prepared for the Special 
Rapporteur on Racism on the Occasion of His 2008 Mission to the US, available at http:// 
ccrjustice.org/files/2008%20Report%20on%20NYPD%20Racial%20Profiling%20&%20Brutality%20t
o%20UN%20SR%20on%20Racism.pdf (2008). The Rand Committee Corporation, relying on data in 
the NYPD’s electronic database that is not available to the public, reached even bleaker conclusions, 
finding that 89% of persons stopped by police in 2006 were people of color. Once stopped, 45% of 
Blacks or Latino (or Latina) suspects were frisked, compared to only 29% of Whites, even though 
Whites were 70% more likely than Blacks to carry a weapon. See Greg Ridgeway, Analysis of Racial 
Disparities in the New York Police Department’s Stop, Question, and Frisk Practices, RAND 
Corporation (2007). 
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higher rates of criminality among these African Americans may stem from real 
or perceived limitations on their job, educational, and other life prospects and 
on their geographic mobility.268 If that is so, their rate of crime-commission will 
be relatively inelastic, meaning it will decline little, if at all, even in the face of 
increased police commitment of resources to capturing African Americans. 
On the other hand, Whites may have resisted crime at an assumed starting 
point at which they faced the same risk of capture as African Americans 
precisely because the Whites had greater real or perceived life opportunities 
relative to Blacks. Under the new regime of profiling Blacks, this last 
observation, when combined with the new, almost certain freedom of Whites 
from being identified and punished, suggests a comparatively elastic white 
offending rate,269 meaning a much greater increase in white offending rates from 
a sharp decline in detection relative to the decline in black offending rates from 
racial profiling. Moreover, Whites, even those on the lower end of the income 
scale, are still a much larger group than Blacks.270 
Accordingly, it is likely that racial generalizations will increase the absolute 
amount of serious white crime more than it will decrease that of serious black 
crime. From both the black perspective and the overall societal perspective, the 
use of race-based generalizations is inequitable because the price paid by 
Blacks’ being stopped (most of whom will still be innocent) and arrested, when 
guilty, will increase rather than decrease crime. The price being paid in 
diminished liberties is, therefore, not worth the benefits. 
b. Inequality. Inequality effects can simultaneously magnify the 
inequitable nature of generalized race-based (even partly or completely 
subconsciously race-based) policing. Professor Bernard Harcourt makes this 
 
 268. See HARCOURT, supra note 264, at 24 (“Whether the different offending rates are due to 
different socioeconomic backgrounds, to different histories, cultures, or [to] education, nonspurious 
profiling rests on the accurate assumption that members of one group offend more than those of 
another, holding everything else constant.”). 
 269. It is important to stress the importance of comparative inelasticities. If rates of crime reduction 
(elasticity relative to policing) for Blacks are lower than those for Whites, all else being equal, then 
stopping more Blacks but fewer Whites raises overall crime. See id. at 2324. But this example assumes 
that, before profiling, black crime rates were indeed higher than white rates, for, without that 
assumption, profiling rests on a spurious association. Yet, argues Harcourt, if poor Blacks at the 
starting point offend more “because they are socioeconomically more disadvantaged, then it would 
follow logically that they may also have less elasticity of offending to policing because they have fewer 
alternative job opportunities.” Id. at 24. This is sound, informed speculation, but we currently have no 
hard data, “no good idea how the elasticities compare.” Id. But, insists Harcourt, given informed 
speculation to the contrary and the high potential individual and social costs of race-based (or other 
group-based) searches and seizures, there is “no good reason” to assume alternative elasticities and 
absolute numbers in which profiling is more beneficial than harmful to society as a wholeand this is 
true even if police initially seem to achieve higher “hit rates” for evidence of criminality by instituting 
profiling. See id. at 24, 12324. 
 270. See id. at 24 (“Because of the different elasticities and the fact that the profiled are usually small 
minorities, the raw increase in offending among the nonprofiled group will be greater numerically than 
the raw decrease in offending of the profiled group.”) (emphasis added). 
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point by examining the “ratchet effect.” 271 He explains this effect by using a 
fishing analogy.272 Suppose that the Mediterranean Sea is filled with bass, but 
the Atlantic Ocean is sparsely populated by salt-water trout. Fishermen 
focusing mostly on the Atlantic will have a much smaller catch than those 
focusing more on the Mediterranean for the same effort. Accordingly, 
fishermen will eventually move toward fishing only in the Mediterranean, thus 
catching only bass. The number of bass might, however, diminish over time 
from all the heavy fishing in the Mediterranean, while the number of trout in 
the Atlantic might start to rise because no fishermen prowl there for aquatic 
prey. Yet the dead hand of history, showing fishermen’s relative successes and 
failures between fishing in one body of water versus the other, will at least slow, 
and may entirely prevent, the fishermen from recognizing the likely change in 
relative fish populations. If that change is sufficiently great, the fishermen might 
now improve their overall catch, at least temporarily, by returning to their 
earlier fishing patterns. Yet they fail to recognize this new reality. 
If Blacks are bass and Whites are trout, and if we add in the relative 
inelasticity of Blacks, but relative elasticity of Whites to capture rates discussed 
above, here is what happens: Police (the fishermen) focus more of their search 
efforts on poor black neighborhoods, fewer on white ones. Police notice a high 
“success rate” in this strategy, thus, like the fishermen, eventually devoting 
nearly all resources in trawling black rather than white neighborhoods, taking 
every successful arrest as an indication of the strategy’s wisdom. But black 
crime rates stay the same or fall just at the moment when white crime rates and 
absolute offending levels rise. Police are thus focusing their long-term efforts in 
the wrong place. Overall crime likely increases from this misappropriation of 
resources alone but, even if it does not, the black community as a whole and its 
individual members will rightly perceive that they are charged a higher price in 
lost liberties to attain purported safety than are Whites. Moreover, the greater 
relative poverty and limited life opportunities of Blacks relative to Whites 
violates the “need” principle of distributive justicethe idea that the 
disadvantaged should pay lower, not higher, prices for the same services.273 
Yet violations of these inequality and need principles have feedback effects 
on real and perceived lack of equity. As discussed earlier, substantial social 
science demonstrates that denial of procedural and distributive justice likely has 
at least two ill effects.274 Notably, those perceiving themselves as unfairly treated 
 
 271. See id. at 147. 
 272. See id. at 14748. This example is altered slightly for clarity and to use a more savory species of 
fish. 
 273. See MAXWELL, supra note 211, at 74. 
 274. Procedural justice is generally the far more significant contributor to decision acceptance than 
is distributive justice. See TYLER & HUO, supra note 242, at 5051, 5457. Nevertheless, distributive 
justice also promotes outcome acceptance. See id. Perhaps more importantly, in the law-enforcement 
context, it is hard to separate out these effects in a practical way, even if their relative contributions can 
be analyzed statistically. This is so because, for example, the same police behaviorhere, racial 
profilingcan lead to both unfair distributive justice and unfair procedural justice or motive-based 
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are more likely to disobey the law again in the future.275 Perceptions of injustice 
or unfairness thus increase actual crime rates.276 Furthermore, communities 
perceiving their members as ill-treated by the justice system reduce their 
cooperation with the police in deterring and prosecuting crime.277 By thus 
reducing police detection and justice-system punishment rates, fewer of the 
guilty pay a deserved price for their misconduct, and crime rates may further 
rise as the guilty see capture and punishment as less likely. At the same time, 
racially skewed policing practices amplify the public association between 
blackness and crime, thus further limiting Blacks’ life chances, as many studies, 
including those concerning employment discrimination, have shown.278 But such 
life-opportunity limitations are further likely to increase black crime rates.279 
c. Spuriousness. Note that the entire discussion above assumed the 
accuracythe nonspurious natureof the generalizations that police make 
when initially deciding to rely upon them. But what if these generalizations are 
spurious? In that case, all the effects just recounted should be far greater. In 
particular, an increasing percentage of Blacks stopped will be entirely innocent. 
Stopping the innocent in itself violates deeply rooted perceptions of fairness, 
apart from concerns about inequality. Two justice-perception researchers put it 
like this: 
People are interested in the message the process used to handle their problem 
communicates about their standing as full participants in the society. People want to 
believe that third parties care about their concerns, consider their arguments, and try 
to be fair to them—symbols of particularistic attention.280 
 
trust perceptions, as illustrated above. Moreover, this problem shows why I often prefer the lens of the 
fair-price-theory economist to the justice psychologist, though they are both close cousins. The 
economist views equity not simply in terms of favorable outcomes or their distribution but also as 
getting a good enough outcome for the price paid. See supra notes 26262 and accompanying text. The 
higher civil-liberties price paid by profiled groups must be weighed against the relative benefits they 
receive from the new style of policing, benefits likely to be seen by them as small, especially given their 
frequent preference for community-based healing approaches (“restorative justice”) over more 
militaristic, retributive approaches to the problem of crime. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Fourth Amendment 
Federalism and the Political Silencing of the American Poor, 85 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 277, 29395 
(2010). Finally, the policing context seems to me one in which resentments at any sort of injustice are 
often likely to run high.  
 275. See Tom R. Tyler, Afterword, in TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 269, 26988 
(new afterword ed., 2006). 
 276. See id. 
 277. See id.; see generally BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, 
UNDERSTANDING COMMUNITY POLICING: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION (1994); DAVID A. HARRIS, 
PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK 11728 (2002) (discussing the 
damage to minority-group trust and willingness to cooperate with the police and to the criminal-justice 
system’s perceived legitimacy); David A. Harris, Racial Profiling Revisited: “Just Common Sense in the 
Fight Against Terror,” 17 CRIM. JUST. MAGAZINE 3641, 59 (2002) (summarizing empirical data). 
 278. See Taslitz, supra note 208, at 111821 (discussing the “bystander effects”). 
 279. See id. 
 280. Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN 
LAW 84 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001) (emphasis added). 
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This observation suggests that part of the benefit of procedural and 
distributive justice is to convey the sense of particularistic attention to each 
individual’s qualities and behavior. But this is precisely one of the purposes of 
the individualized-suspicion requirement in probable-cause and reasonable-
suspicion determinations.281 If minoritiesindeed if anyoneperceive that they 
have been reasonably treated in a particularistic fashion, they are more likely to 
accept policing error in the name of some greater good.282 
This discussion might leave the impression that eliminating race-based 
generalities alone, rather than other sorts of generalities, would be sufficient to 
address procedural and distributive fairness concerns. Race certainly provides 
the starkest example of the problem of overgeneralization. But the problems 
recounted here occur with many other generalizations as well.283 The problem is 
not merely with race but with the generalization process itself.284 
d.  Retribution. Finally, the denial of procedural and substantive justice 
sparks a desire for retribution.285 This desire is strongest when social rather than 
personal unfairness is incurred. Personal unfairness occurs when one person or 
process violates another person’s hopes or expectations; but social unfairness 
occurs when prescriptive norms of how persons or institutions should 
behavenorms that society as a whole embraces as defining right and 
wrongare violated.286 Most of the discussion above concerns violation of just 
these prescriptive social norms. Such violations communicate the message that 
the offended individual is not worthy of the protections that shield the rest of 
the community.287 That individual’s sense of insult may be magnified if she 
perceives it as extending as well to a group with whom she strongly identifies.288 
Under such circumstances, the group as a whole may likewise take offense from 
the harm done to the individual.289 The individual and the group seek societal 
punishment of the wrongdoerhere, individual police or a police unit or 
department as a wholeto send the unequivocal message that offender and 
offended are of equal value, thus entitled to equal protection of social-fairness 
norms.290 
If courts or other governmental bodies do not provide the necessary 
retribution, offended individuals and groups will do so themselves. As a 
 
 281. See supra text accompanying notes 34, 4950. 
 282. See Tyler & Lind, supra note 280, at 84 (noting that “particularistic attention” is central to 
procedural justice). 
 283. See HARCOURT, supra note 264, at 21523. 
 284. See id. at 21517. 
 285. For a more extensive analysis of the concept of retributive justice, see Andrew E. Taslitz, The 
Inadequacies of Civil Society: Law’s Complementary Role in Regulating Harmful Speech, 1 MARGINS 
305 (2001). 
 286. See MAXWELL, supra note 211, at 75. 
 287. See Taslitz, supra note 199, at 5058. 
 288. See id. 
 289. See id. 
 290. See Taslitz, supra note 285, at 31322, 33839. 
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practical matter, this may ordinarily be done by shunning (not cooperating with 
the police) or by complaint.291 But if these actions fail to elicit a firm government 
response or are insufficient to invoke outrage over a particularly egregious 
abuse or longstanding pattern of abuses, retributive anger will not be sated. In 
such instances, that anger can explode in community protests, aggressive 
resistance to policing, or even the violence of riots.292 In this way too, therefore, 
the individualized-suspicion requirement promotes social stability and physical 
safety. 
B.  Privacy and Its Cousins 
 
1. Respect and Privacy Defined and Linked to Individualized Suspicion 
Respect as fittingness is the idea that each person is entitled to be treated in 
accordance with his status concerning some specified attribute.293 Any lesser 
treatment is insulting. Human-rights theorists debate what attribute of sameness 
all humans share. To some theorists it is being made in the image of God, to 
others it is the capacity to achieve moral goodness, and to still others it is 
rationality and autonomyhumans’ nature as self-directing beings legislating 
their own life plans.294 Whatever the quality we all share, that quality entails 
certain rights or entitlements without which our status as humans is ignored.295 
Freedom of conscience, privacy, the right to own property earned by the sweat 
of the brow, and freedom of movement are among the rights commonly deemed 
to belong to every person simply by nature of her humanity.296 Furthermore, 
many “fittingness theorists” agree that these sorts of entitlements necessarily 
 
 291. See supra text accompanying notes 27676 (noting reduced citizen willingness to cooperate 
with the police, a form of “exit” from unfair or ineffective institutions); HIRSCHMAN, supra note 232 
(explaining when participants in institutions choose “voice” (that is, complaint) over exit as a strategy 
for seeking correction of those institutions’ flaws). 
 292. See Taslitz, supra note 189, at 24448. 
 293. See GEOFFREY CUPIT, JUSTICE AS FITTINGNESS 12, 15–28 (1996) (describing “respect” and 
“justice” as part of the same family of concepts, with respect being the broader idea). 
 294. See JOHN E. COONS & PATRICK M. BRENNAN, BY NATURE EQUAL: THE ANATOMY OF A 
WESTERN INSIGHT 13, 11622 (1999) (contrasting moral goodness); see also MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE 
IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES 1141 (1998) (arguing that the idea of human rights is 
“ineliminably religious”); WILLIAM F. SCHULTZ, IN OUR OWN BEST INTEREST: HOW DEFENDING 
HUMAN RIGHTS BENEFITS US ALL 1731 (2001) (offering pragmatic arguments for accepting the ideas 
of human rights and equality). 
 295. See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 
UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1697 (1992). 
 296. See, e.g., JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
ORIGINS, DRAFTING, & INTENT 1356, 7375 (1999) (recognizing privacy, property, and free 
movement as universal rights); cf. Martha Minow, Equality and the Bill of Rights, in THE 
CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 118, 11828 (Michael J. 
Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992) (discussing how human dignity and equality are embraced in 
the Bill of Rights, especially in the protections of the First Amendment). 
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imply diversity in life choices.297 Respect must therefore be shown for the sorts 
of differences that are central to personal identity.298 Respect thus requires an 
appreciation of diversity and uniqueness among sameness. Disrespect, 
correspondingly, consists of treating another in a manner reasonably 
understood as inconsistent with equally valuing that other for both the salient 
ways in which she is like us and the ways in which she is legitimately different 
from us. 
Privacy, properly understood, is part of what defines us as, and enables us to 
be, unique. Human beings are complex, wearing different masks in different 
situations.299 We may, for example, be punctual at work but tardy to parties.300 
No single mask is inauthentic; each represents an aspect of ourselves.301 
Moreover, we value each mask for three reasons. First, it takes time to get to 
know a person in all his or her fullness, so each of us fears being misjudged by 
others if they see only a part of us, particularly if it is a part about which we fear 
they will disapprove.302 Second, controlling what aspects of our nature we let 
certain persons see allows us to develop other aspects of our personalitiesour 
on-average way of thinking and behavingfree of their gaze, thus free of 
pressures toward conformity.303 That freedom, in turn, allows us to pursue our 
own unique interests, learning and doing what we want, how we want, within 
broad limits.304 Third, because only time and the slow development of trust allow 
 
 297. “Fittingness” is an idea that captures an underlying similarity among theorists writing about 
respect, dignity, insult, and humiliation. See CUPIT, supra note 293, at 24, 1323, 4648, 6063, 92. I 
thus refer to them all as “fittingness theorists.” On the importance of diversity in life choices, see Jean 
Hampton, Retribution and the Liberal State, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 117, 14041 (1994) 
(defending a “perfectionist liberalism” in which the state must promote “value pluralism,” so that 
citizens have plenty of options and opportunities to choose from in creating their lives). 
 298. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Condemning the Racist Personality: Why the Critics of Hate Crimes 
Legislation Are Wrong, 40 B.C. L. REV. 739, 74665 (1999) (making similar point); see also AVISHAI 
MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY 13538, 14042, 153, 15861 (1996). Margalit is what I call a 
“negative” fittingness theorist, focusing on what conduct we must avoid if we do not wish to insult 
others. See id. at 9, 112, 115, 137. Cupit is a “positive” fittingness theorist, focusing on what conduct 
entitles us to receive respect. See CUPIT, supra note 293, at 24, 6, 1518, n.10. 
 299. See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Technology, 
Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 152 (Spring 2002). 
 300. See id. at 153. 
 301. See id.; JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN 
AMERICA 89, 12, 21819 (2000) (originating the “mask” terminology). 
 302. See Taslitz, supra note 299, at 15355. 
 303. See id. at 155, 158. As law professor Lawrence Lessig puts it, 
We all deserve to live in separate communities. Privacy, or the ability to control data about 
yourself, supports this desire. It enables these multiple communities and disables the power of 
one dominant community to norm others into oblivion. Think, for example, about a gay man 
in an intolerant small town. 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 15253 (1999). On the definition of 
“personality,” see Taslitz, supra note 5, at 3134. 
 304. See PATRICIA BOLING, PRIVACY AND THE POLITICS OF THE INTIMATE LIFE 79 (1996) (“A 
third reason to respect the individual’s privacy about intimate-life decisions has to do with the need to 
value and respect diversity. Scrutinizing an individual’s intimate practices and demanding conformity to 
an implicit standard promotes homogeneity and undercuts and devalues differences. Assuming an 
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us to reveal increasingly more of ourselves to another, we define the nature and 
degree of intimacy we have with particular others by the degree to which we 
reveal information about ourselves to them and by the content of such 
revelation.305  
Privacy is thus the creation of metaphorical boundaries that protect us 
against the risk of being misdefined and judged out of context.306 Privacy is 
therefore one way by which we express our need for individualized justice: for 
being judged for who we really are.307 Yet privacy also gives us the freedom to 
choose who we are, to follow our own paths in a way that gives life meaning and 
permits the development of life-enhancing human relationships and human 
autonomy. Moreover, because privacy enables us to develop and define our 
sense of self, we experience invasions of privacy as assaults on our identity.308 
Privacy protects self-definition by giving each of us some control over important 
information about ourselves, so it is the loss of control, rather than revelation 
itself, that wounds us. 
John Stuart Mill long ago wrote of the importance of being freed from 
“social tyranny,” the “tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling,” which can 
be “more formidable than many kinds of political oppression” because society 
itself becomes the tyrant.309 Said Mill, this sort of social tyranny “maim[s] by 
compression, like a Chinese lady’s foot, every part of human nature that stands 
out.”310 
Privacy theorist and law professor Jed Rubenfeld cautions, however, that a 
focus solely on privacy in the Fourth Amendment context unduly restricts that 
Amendment’s scope.311 Notably, he argues, freedom of movement is also 
necessary to developing individual uniqueness.312 If we cannot visit the friends, 
 
essentialized identity based on intimate affiliations or decisions likewise renders the diversity of 
people’s experiences invisible and places normalizing pressure on different or dissenting group 
members.”). See generally JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND 
THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 66 (1997) (stating that privacy marks a zone of interests beyond the 
legitimate concerns of others to protect against pressures to conform or to reveal one’s vulnerabilities); 
FERDINAND DAVID SCHOEMAN, PRIVACY AND SOCIAL FREEDOM (1992) (asserting that freedom 
from scrutiny and judgment permits us to talk, think, and act in ways that express our unique individual 
identities). 
 305. See, e.g., ANITA ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 52 
(1987) (“[T]he exercise of privacy-promoting liberties enhances persons and personal relationships in 
ways that cannot be ignored by those who feel ethically constrained to treat persons as more than 
things.”); see also ROSEN, supra note 301, at 8 (discussing how control over which masks we reveal 
promotes intimate relationships). 
 306. See ROSEN, supra note 301, at 8. 
 307. See Taslitz, supra note 5, at 2430 (defining individualized justice); Taslitz, supra note 298, at 
74658 (elaborating on the meaning and significance of individualized justice). 
 308. See Taslitz, supra note 299, at 155, 17071. 
 309. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13, 129 (1859; photo reprint, 2002). 
 310. See id. at 13, 129. 
 311. See Rubenfeld, supra note 240, at 207, 20911. 
 312. See id. at 211; cf. Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right to Locomotion: The Fourth 
Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258 (1990). 
TASLITZ 12/22/2010  3:32:52 PM 
188 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 73:145 
neighbors, social or political groups, movies, or libraries we choose without 
being accosted, that too hampers our ability to make choices, ponder ideas, 
experience emotions, and exchange information and arguments free from the 
state’s judgment.313 Furthermore, argues Rubenfeld, privacy’s development in 
the Fourth Amendment sphere should be more robust than in the sphere of our 
everyday lives because that Amendment creates a distinctive body of law 
governing those who enforce the law, primarily the police.314 The Amendment, 
he maintains, must be seen as distinctive because of the government’s 
qualitatively and quantitatively unique and massive ability to intrude, monitor, 
punish, and regulate individuals’ lives relative to the private sector.315 The 
Amendment is also distinctive, however, because it grants the government both 
a right and a duty to intrude into individuals’ private livescommitting acts 
that would ordinarily constitute thefts, criminal trespasses, or assaultsthat 
private persons lack.316 Rubenfeld thus prefers the broader term “personal life” 
to the narrower term “privacy” to describe the extent of the intrusion.317 
I would add to Rubenfeld’s point about the Fourth Amendment’s 
distinctiveness its communicative, if not necessarily logical, link to the criminal-
justice system. That system is the ultimate judge.318 The material consequences 
of that judgment, such as imprisonment or death, are far more consequential 
than those imposed by private parties.319 Conviction, or even arrest, can diminish 
future job consequences, kill marriages, strain family ties, leave children 
temporarily or permanently abandoned, friends lost.320 Furthermore, conviction 
in modern American society marks the convicted as an outsider to the political 
community, a lesser citizen in fact if not formally so in law.321 
Moreover, the condemnation represented by a conviction is far more 
extensive than, and of a different nature from, that stemming from lesser 
wrongs. It is one thing to be blamed by one’s spouse, children, friends, or even 
one’s church or neighborhood for letting them down. It is another thing to also 
 
 313. See Rubenfeld, supra note 240, at 22021. 
 314. See id. at 21214. 
 315. See id. at 214. 
 316. See id. 
 317. See id. at 20809. Rubenfeld develops his idea of personal life at greater length in Jed 
Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101 (2008). 
 318. See Taslitz, supra note 285, at 31355 (comparing the social roles of the civil and criminal-
justice systems and concluding that the latter is the ultimate assessor of culpability). 
 319. See RICHARD G. SINGER, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE II: FROM BAIL TO JAIL 255300 (2005) 
(summarizing the sentencing options available in the criminal-justice system). 
 320. See generally INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS 
IMPRISONMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (outlining the harms done to the 
defendant, his family, friends, neighborhood, and society at large that were not part of his announced 
sentence, but necessarily accompany it). 
 321. See Taslitz, supra note 285, at 356 (“The exclusion of the offender from being a full member of 
the moral–political community (literal exclusion as well, in the case of imprisonment) has a powerful 
impact in reaffirming social norms.”). 
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be entirely blamed by the entire political community, yet that is just what a 
criminal conviction represents.322 
So powerful is the condemnatory message of the criminal-justice system that 
any involvement with it, even well short of conviction, carries a taint. To be 
arrested, even to be stopped and questioned, absent various Fourth 
Amendment safeguards, is to risk humiliation and insult, certainly to fear those 
consequences—or worse.323 
The individualized-suspicion requirement protects the uniqueness-fostering 
function of privacyor, if you prefer, of “personal life”in several ways. 
Importantly, police need a significant level of justification for intruding upon 
privacy.324 They may not do so on mere conjecture. Moreover, that justification 
for intrusion must itself respect the individual’s uniqueness, for individualized 
suspicion must be based on the individual’s actions and behavior.325 
Furthermore, those actions and the self-revelation they involve are generally 
freely chosennot the result of state compulsion or demandthus respecting 
the individual’s autonomy.326 Additionally, individualized suspicion may not be 
assumed or guessed at but rather must result from reliance on a sufficient 
quality and quantity of evidence to support a reasonable and articulable 
concern about past or impending criminality by this person.327 This evidentiary 
barrier is an independent element of procedural justice and an obstacle to too-
ready state incursions upon persons’ private worlds.328 Police do not objectively 
manifest disrespect toward persons when police stop or search them based on 
trustworthy evidence of their voluntary (in the sense that it is not state-coerced) 
revelation of aspects of their selves that justify suspicion of their criminality.329 
 
 322. See id. at 31355 (defending this very point but also noting that tortious civil liability, unlike 
criminal liability, is more about blame being placed by individuals than by the entire community). 
 323. See, e.g., Taslitz, supra note 199, at 3341 (examining the arrest of a mother in front of her two 
children for the crime of driving without a seat belt); see also Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 
(2001) (setting forth and analyzing the facts that were the basis for the driving without a seatbelt 
discussion above); cf. Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 
349 (1997) (discussing the criminal law’s influence on social norms as well as law’s influence more 
generally). 
 324. See supra text accompanying notes 57, 166, 303-07, 317. 
 325. See supra text accompanying notes 533, 50. 
 326. See Rubenfeld, supra note 240, at 21619, 221. For a dystopian vision of the impact of such 
autonomy invasion taken to the extreme, see Andrew E. Taslitz, Privacy as Struggle, 44 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 501 (2007). 
 327. See supra text accompanying notes 56; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (requiring 
reasonable suspicion to be based upon “specific and articulable” facts). Although the Court generally 
uses the “specific and articulable” facts language in connection with “reasonable suspicion,” surely 
those same requirementsbut in more robust formmust inhere in the more protective “probable 
cause standard.” 
 328. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
132 (1988) (“To the extent that procedure includes provisions that assure that decisions will be based 
on accurate information and on well-informed or expert opinion, procedural fairness will be 
enhanced.”). 
 329. See, e.g., TASLITZ, supra note 4, at 258590\: 
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Disrespect is, instead, fairly perceived when the police seem to be acting 
without an adequate evidentiary basis or upon generalizations or surmise.330 In 
such instances, the innocent man feels rightly robbed of the good reputation he 
has striven to deserve. “Here the belief exists that the ‘not guilty’ should not be 
punished. Pain and punishment [are] not warranted. In addition, here the 
individual does the right thing, takes the right precautions, yet pain and 
punishment strike anyway.”331 This concept is not a comparative one of 
inequality but an absolute one of the “good” person “getting unfairly 
punished”;332 and, as explained above, unjustified, nonindividualized stops by 
police are indeed often rightly experienced (and always entitled to be 
experienced) as akin to punishment, certainly as an infliction of psychic pain 
rather than mere inconvenience. 
 
2.  The Drive To Be, and To Be Thought of, As Unique. 
 a. Cognitive modules and human uniqueness. The importance of being, 
and being thought of as, unique cannot be overstated. It is likely rooted in 
fundamental aspects of human psychology, though culture may also play a 
role.333 Pulitzer Prize finalist Judith Rich Harris synthesized the recent work 
being done on the human mind by both cognitive scientists and evolutionary 
psychologists into a persuasive explanation of why each individual is indeed in 
many ways unique, while also sharing so much with many others.334 To be sure, 
Harris recognizes the impact of the usual suspects of individual heredity and the 
environment in explaining human variation.335 However, she also finds other 
powerful individual and social mechanisms at work by which each of us tries to 
be like others in some ways, different from them in others. These mechanisms 
are rooted in three systems or “modules” in the brain: the socialization, 
relationship, and status modules.336 
 
[A]ny unduly group-based suspicions risk treating people like fungible property rather than as 
unique human beings, a form of treatment meant to die with slavery. On the other hand, the 
Reconstruction Congress was as concerned with whites’ rights as blacks’. The black 
experience under slavery underscores the value of the individualized-justice principle to 
human dignity, but it is a principle that must be revitalized for all persons, regardless of race. 
Id. at 259; cf. Taslitz, supra note 208, at 112145 (examining how flawed informants’ evidence at the 
search-warrant stage can lead not only to wrongful arrests but to wrongful convictions). 
 330. See Taslitz, supra note 299, at 15874 (illustrating how group-based suspicion and reliance on 
assumption over trustworthy evidence has limited the modern autonomy of gays, the poor, and racial 
minorities, simultaneously insulting them all). 
 331. Norman J. Finkel, But It’s Not Fair!: Commonsense Notions of Unfairness, 6 PSYCH., PUB. 
POL’Y, & L. 898, 910 (2000). 
 332. See id. at 91011. 
 333. See generally JUDITH RICH HARRIS, NO TWO ALIKE: HUMAN NATURE AND HUMAN 
INDIVIDUALITY (2006) (defending this proposition). 
 334. See id. 
 335. See id. at 2426, 4041. 
 336. See id. at 10662. 
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Briefly, the socialization module is the cognitive system that works to make 
us more like those in our group.337 Humans have a strong need to belong to a 
group, finding pleasure in solidarity and acceptance.338 Group membership can 
also protect us from groups hostile to our own or from the vicissitudes and 
isolation of a life lived alone.339 Part of each person’s sense of uniqueness indeed 
comes from the particular intersection of his multiple group identities, for 
example, as a young Jewish Northeastern heterosexual Democrat or a mature 
Christian Southern gay Republican.340 The socialization system teaches us the 
rules for being like others in our group.341 
The relationship system, like the socialization system, likely had important 
evolutionary advantages but of an almost opposite kind.342 Despite group 
identification, there are important differences among individuals, or at least 
among their relationships with one another.343 The relationship system allows us 
to recognize one individual as physically distinct from another and then to 
understand in as much depth as possible what makes that person’s character 
unique.344 This second goal turns on our effectiveness as mind readers. If we can 
better understand what makes another person tick differently, we can more 
effectively judge how to relate to them, maximizing the benefits of interaction.345 
Mind-reading aids us in determining whether another will help us if we are in 
need, repay our favors, be a reliable trading partner, have sex with us, be a 
trustworthy mate, like us or hate us, be gentle with us, or beat us up.346 The 
relationship system, unlike the socialization system, is thus “a discriminator, not 
a generalizera splitter, not a lumper.”347 Furthermore, among the distinctions 
the system makes are those that give hints about each person’s relative 
 
 337. See id. at 19395, 206. 
 338. See TASLITZ, supra note 84, at 13435; ROY BAUMEISTER, THE CULTURAL ANIMAL: HUMAN 
NATURE, MEANING, AND SOCIAL LIFE 377 (2005) (discussing the importance of group-belongingness); 
DAVID BERREBY, US AND THEM: UNDERSTANDING YOUR TRIBAL MIND 16 (2005) (noting that 
group affiliation is “an absolute requirement for being human”). 
 339. See BAUMEISTER, supra note 338, at 10709 (noting that belongingness promotes happiness, 
mental and physical health, and that “[g]roups can share resources, care for sick members, scare off 
predators, fight together against enemies, divide tasks so as to improve efficiency, and contribute to 
survival in many other ways”); see also id. at 378 (“People may have evolved to recognize the presence 
of an enemy group and to seek to form bonds and alliances for their own protection.”). 
 340. See Taslitz, Feminist Approach, supra note 180, at 23 (“[O]ur social identityour sense of who 
we are and what we are worthis intimately bound up with our group memberships.”); see also 
TASLITZ, supra note 84, at 135 (“Although all individuals are unique, some part of how we express 
ourselves draws on group self-concepts . . . .”). 
 341. See HARRIS, supra note 312, at 19395. 
 342. See id. at 161. 
 343. See id. at 89 (explaining that, although we exaggerate the consistency in other people’s 
behavior, individual differencescharacter traitsare real). 
 344. See id. at 16973. 
 345. See id. at 165, 17475; BERREBY, supra note 338, at 12325 (describing the importance of 
gathering information about particular individuals over time to improve our ability to mind-read them). 
 346. See HARRIS, supra note 312, at 165. 
 347. Id. at 181. 
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dominance and submissiveness and overall status within the group.348 This 
information can be crucial in resolving, or even in avoiding, intra-group 
conflict.349 Of course, “mind reading” is a best guess, but we are driven to do our 
best to guess correctly, and those most often right likely had an evolutionary 
advantage over others.350 
The status system leads each of us to want to be better than, rather than 
equal to or similar to, others, or at least to know where we stand in the status 
hierarchy and how to move within it.351 Higher status is its own reward but also 
brings easier access to more community resources.352 Status inheres in how most 
other members of the community view you or would view you if they knew 
you.353 Accordingly, judging our own status requires a special sort of mind 
readingreading what status another assigns to us and why.354 Status is also 
multidimensional and varies with context.355 For example, a lousy athlete has 
low status on a baseball team. But the same person might have high status as a 
journalist.356 
How do these systems work in combination? Our relationship system drives 
us to mind-read others, both to understand their unique qualities and to 
determine what they see as our unique qualities. Nevertheless, our status system 
also drives us to mind-read others to determine what they think about us, more 
specifically, what status they on average assign us.357 Actual differences in 
individuals’ talents may often initially be small. But the relationship system 
drives others to focus on these differences, while the status system prods those 
others to assign a status to us based on those perceived differences.358 If we 
adequately understand how others judge us, we will seek to improve our status 
accordingly. We do this by putting more effort into that which brings us higher 
status, less effort into that which brings us the opposite.359 Similarly, we seek out 
environments in which we can display our high-status talents, avoiding 
 
 348. See id. 
 349. See id. (“Obligations must be repaid, duplicity remembered, compatible companions sought 
out, obnoxious ones avoided, those with higher status deferred to.”). 
 350. See id. 
 351. See id. at 209 (“To compete with one’s groupmates is to strive for status . . . .”); TASLITZ, supra 
note 84, at 13437 (explaining that different groups have different social statuses, so the status of an 
individual is inescapably also linked to the status of his group). 
 352. See TASLITZ, supra note 84, at 112. 
 353. See ALAIN DE BOTTON, STATUS ANXIETY viviii (2004). 
 354. See HARRIS, supra note 333, at 22426. 
 355. See id. at 212. 
 356. See id. at 226; ROBERT W. FULLER, ALL RISE: SOMEBODIES, NOBODIES, AND THE POLITICS 
OF DIGNITY 15 (2006) (“But, unlike a chicken coop, modern human societies comprise thousands of 
different hierarchies, and a person at the bottom of one may be at the top of another. The worst bowler 
on the company team may be the CEO. The college dropout may be a billionaire.”). 
 357. See HARRIS, NO TWO ALIKE, supra note 333, at 221, 225. 
 358. See id. at 218. 
 359. See HARRIS, supra note 333, at 227, 239, 247. 
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situations bringing us low status.360 Here I define “talents” broadly to include 
personality traits as well as intellectual and physical skillsthe whole panoply 
of potential human thoughts, emotions, and behavior.361 
For example, if we are perceived as physically weak but admired for our 
kindness, we might more often choose settings where kindness is valued and 
work to emphasize what is kind about our behavior. To be sure, we could also 
choose to go to the gym and bulk up, but our short stature and delicate frame 
may make it hard for us to get much mileage out of this strategy, and it is, in any 
event, easier for us to build on what we already see as our strengths. We might 
have more ability to change other traits, such as being a poor dresser, provided 
we have the money and a good source of sartorial advice.362 Our kind behavior 
reinforces our self-image as kind, even at the subconscious level, as do the 
rewards we receive in praise and self-satisfaction.363 Perceptions of our kind 
nature can also open doors to us that otherwise might be closed where skilled 
kindness is needed.364 Social-science research suggests that our efforts to stand 
out for possessing a trait, such as kindness, tend to take root as longer-lasting 
aspects of our character if they persist to about age sixteen.365 In this way the 
best nurses and schoolteachers are born. Persons who find status in physical 
strength and aggression, on the other hand, might become the sumo wrestlers 
and other athletes of the future. 
In sum, our relationship system drives us to be seen by others as unique, 
while our status system drives us to see ourselves as, and to become, unique. 
Although our relationship system drives us to seek commonalities with others, 
those others are categorized into groups, and our particular combination of 
group identities combines with the ways we strive for individual difference to 
add to our uniqueness.366 Philosopher William James captured the strength of 
 
 360. See id. at 239 (declaring that the status system is social information that a person uses “to plot a 
long-term strategy that will involve direct competition only in those areas of endeavor in which the 
individual has a hope of succeeding”). 
 361. See id. at 21819, 23840, 247. 
 362. Cf. id. at 239 (emphasizing that individuals use status information to place themselves in 
situations in which they believe they have the most hope of improving their status by improving their 
actual or perceived performance). 
 363. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Willfully Blinded: On Date Rape and Self-Deception, 28 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 381, 438 (2005). 
 364. Cf. KIERON O’HARA, TRUST: FROM SOCRATES TO SPIN 14 (2004) (“What does trust buy you? 
It gets you out of a state of uncertainty . . . . [I]f someone has promised to help you, and you trust her, 
then you can plan on that basis.”); see also PAUL SEABRIGHT, THE COMPANY OF STRANGERS: A 
NATURAL HISTORY OF ECONOMIC LIFE 54 (2004) (“[Humans have evolved] through selection for 
what is sometimes called ‘reciprocity,’ namely, an instinctive inclination to do unto others as they have 
already done unto you. If others have treated you well, you treat them well in return, but if they have 
hurt you, you hurt them back. An eye for an eye certainly, but also a gift for a gift.”). 
 365. See HARRIS, supra note 333, at 21819. 
 366. See supra text accompanying notes 34264. In addition to these forces, of course, genetic 
tendencies, current environment, life experience, and happenstance all combine to make us uniquely 
who we are. See HARRIS, supra note 333, at 23840, 247. 
TASLITZ 12/22/2010  3:32:52 PM 
194 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 73:145 
our need to be seen as, and to become, unique in these too-little-known but apt 
words: 
The first thing the intellect does with an object is to class it along with something else. 
But any object that is infinitely important to us and awakens our devotion feels to us 
also as if it must be sui generis and unique. Probably a crab would be filled with a 
sense of personal outrage if it could hear us class it without ado or apology as a 
crustacean, and thus dispose of it. “I am no such thing,” it would say; I am MYSELF, 
MYSELF alone.367 
b. Storytelling theory. Another way to understand the uniqueness drive 
is through the lens of storytelling theory. A person who is ten years old today 
will, in twenty years, have different attitudes, beliefs, goals, and desires. He may 
have fewer organs (missing, for example, a gall bladder), may be fatter or 
thinner, more or less energetic. Even at the molecular level, the precise 
molecules constituting his body will have changed. Yet he and others will still 
think of him as the same person, as “Hank Jones” and not suddenly “Clay 
Smith.”368 
What explains this sense of individual continuity is the narrative coherence 
of human lives. We each tell ourselves stories that link the different phases of 
our lives.369 Our sense of self consists largely of these stories.370 “Our plannings, 
our rememberings, even our loving and hating, are guided by narrative plots.”371 
Narratives, of course, move through time, having a beginning, middle, and an 
end.372 One cannot, therefore, be a person at a single moment in time.373 To be a 
person is to be the combination of what you were, are, and will be.374 The 
narrative nature of personhood does not make it a fiction. The narrative is who 
you are.375 
The hero (or antihero, depending upon the plot) of your own story is also its 
author: you. Of course, there are common elements to many stories, including 
 
 367. See WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 2930 (1978) (based on 
lectures delivered in Edinburgh 19011902). 
 368. See JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT 13142 (2001). 
 369. See Taslitz, A Feminist Approach, supra note 180, at 3436. 
 370. See id.; JEROME BRUNER, MAKING STORIES: LAW, LITERATURE, LIFE 6389 (2002) 
(discussing the narrative creation of the self). 
 371. See Theodore R. Sarbin, The Narrative as a Root Metaphor for Psychology, in NARRATIVE 
PSYCHOLOGY: THE STORIED NATURE OF HUMAN CONDUCT 3, 11 (Theodore R. Sarbin ed., 1986). 
 372. See RUBENFELD, supra note 368, at 137; accord BRUNER, supra note 370, at 15 (“[W]e know 
that narrative in all its forms is a dialectic between what was expected and what came to pass.”). 
 373. See RUBENFELD, supra note 368, at 137. 
 374. Id. 
 375. See id. Nor does this mean that the narrative can be based on fictions. Though our memories 
are partly constructed, we do try to create a coherent sense of selfan interpretation of who we 
arebased on our best beliefs about our own experiences as “out there” facts, such as whether we had 
a dog as a child, what persons attended our Bar-Mitzvah, and what our grades were like in school. See 
Taslitz, supra note 180, at 56, 1234 (distinguishing between “out there” facts and interpretive facts). 
The same sort of analysis is true with “peoplehood”: it is defined by a narrative moving over time but is 
not therefore a fiction. See RUBENFELD, supra note 368, at 4548, 13142, 14551. 
TASLITZ 12/22/2010  3:32:52 PM 
Summer 2010]     WHAT IS PROBABLE CAUSE, AND WHY SHOULD WE CARE? 195 
common types of plots.376 But even if this is so, to each individual, her own story, 
and thus her own sense of self, is unique. Only she has experienced the events in 
the story, no one else. Moreover, only her father, mother, sister, brother, 
friends, employers, colleagues, and acquaintances play a role in the tale. She has 
a unique relationship, a special history, with each such person. As the leading 
advocates for understanding the role of individual and group storytelling in 
macroeconomics put it, “[M]uch of human motivation comes from living 
through a story of our lives, a story that we tell to ourselves and that creates a 
framework for motivation.”377 Yet we also share chapters in that story with 
others, much of human conversation consisting of the exchange of just such 
stories.378 
Being the authors of our own tales, and controlling how and when parts of it 
unfold to others, are central aspects of human autonomy.379 When the state 
treats an individual as but a stereotype, the state rewrites the individual’s story 
and how it is told, robbing her of her autonomy. An individualized-suspicion 
requirement minimizes this autonomy invasion, both by recognizing the 
suspect’s authority to write much of her own tale (that is, judging her character, 
motivations, and intentions by her voluntary words and actions) and by at least 
respecting the defining aspect of her story: that she is indeed a unique 
individual. Concerning seizures of the person, such as stops and full-blown 
arrests, and relying on his idea of “personal life,” constitutional-law professor 
Jed Rubenfeld captures part of the sense of injury to autonomy that comes from 
the state’s unwarranted rewriting of the individual suspect’s tale: 
Invasions of privacy are intrusions. Seizures are seclusions. They do not pry into the 
detainee’s prior relationships or things. They take him away from his own life. Every 
seizure has this effect to one degree or another. The more complete the victim’s 
seclusion, the more complete his severance from the places and people he knew, the 
more complete the destruction of his personal life. An imprisoned man loses his 
liberty, of course, but he also loses his lifethe life he used to lead.380 
Indeed, continues Rubenfeld, to have a personal life by definition means to 
have a part of one’s life not belonging to the public or the state. Yet, “[a]n 
imprisoned man belongs to the state.”381 Indeed, “[h]is movements are not his 
own. His time is not his own. His occupations will be directed by his custodians. 
Seizures of the person attack the very existence of personal life.”382 But, as 
Rubenfeld and other commentators have recognized elsewhere, albeit 
sometimes in slightly different language, what makes a life “personal” to a 
 
 376. See RONALD B. TOBIAS, 20 MASTER PLOTS AND HOW TO BUILD THEM iiiiv (1993). 
 377. GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY 
DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 51 (2009). 
 378. See id. 
 379. Cf. TYLER COWEN, CREATE YOUR OWN ECONOMY: THE PATH TO PROSPERITY IN A 
DISORDERED WORLD 3142 (2009) (discussing the economics of storytelling). 
 380. See Rubenfeld, supra note 240, at 220 (emphasis in original). 
 381. Id. 
 382. Id. 
TASLITZ 12/22/2010  3:32:52 PM 
196 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 73:145 
particular individual is the tale he has constructed, his self-defining narrative.383 
The state should rewrite that narrative gingerly and reluctantly, with full respect 
for the distinctive voice of its author. 
c. Mystery and awe. The appeal of the particular, especially in the 
context of law, also has an emotional power that we cannot yet fully explain.384 
Even when relying on a rulewhich is but one kind of generalizationthe 
decisionmaker must craft a narrative from localized evidence to conclude that 
the particular set of facts before her fits the terms of the rule.385 Engaging with 
the particular can thus never be avoided. Choosing what aspects of the 
particular to attend to and how to interpret them likewise requires a 
combination of active concentration, focused intelligence, and informed 
intuition.386 
The rule of law, of course, requires rules, that is, generalizations. But rules 
purport to “appropriate the mystery of the world by forcing each particular 
under their aegis, denying its particularity.”387 Yet in practical decisionmaking 
and to varying degrees, judges cannot in fact deny the particular. They must and 
will engage with it.388 One way to undertake this task is candidly, recognizing the 
necessary tension between the general and the particular, accepting the 
unavoidable anxiety of struggling with that tension.389 Another is self-deception, 
pretending that the rules or generalizations, not the appeal of the individual 
case, dictate the outcome.390 Philosopher Zenon Bankowski thus describes rules 
as a “cowardly way of decisionmaking.”391 The cowardice, he explains, stems 
from the false perception “that I no longer have to make up my mind in the 
encounter with the awesome mystery of the particular before me.”392 The 
individualized-suspicion requirement chooses candor over cowardice. 
Bankowski and his colleague, James MacLean, indeed see this sort of 
candor as essential to justice. The two philosophers declare both formal and 
 
 383. See id. at 220; Taslitz, A Feminist Approach, supra note 180, at 1823, 3446. 
 384. See Zenon Bankowski, In the Judgment Space: The Judge and the Anxiety of the Encounter, in 
THE UNIVERSAL AND THE PARTICULAR IN LEGAL REASONING 25, 2526 (Zenon Bankowski & 
James MacLean eds., 2006). 
 385. See id. at 2728. 
 386. See id. at 3334. 
 387. Id. at 32. 
 388. See John Bell, The Institutional Constraints on Particularism, in THE UNIVERSAL AND THE 
PARTICULAR IN LEGAL REASONING, supra note 384, at 43 (arguing that accountability in the context 
of judicial reasoning requires a public statement demonstrating good reasons for a decision rooted in 
case-specific particulars). 
 389. See Bankowski, supra note 384, at 2729, 33. 
 390. Cf. Andrew E. Taslitz, Interpretive Method and the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Call for a 
Politically Realistic Hermeneutics, 32 HARV. J. LEG. 329, 399401 (making a similar point concerning 
interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence). 
 391. See Bankowski, supra note 384, at 32. 
 392. See id. 
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substantive justice to be requirements of total justice.393 Formal justice aspires 
toward equal treatment of likes under a regime of equal rules.394 But substantive 
justice emphasizes using the values embodied in those rules to do justice in the 
particular case.395 Reconciling the roles of the latter form of justice with the 
former requires often treating rules as flexible guides, even sometimes 
departing from the rules’ rigid application.396 Only doing so, these authors 
explain, addresses the “real pain and hurt” of the particular case.397 
Bankowski himself argues that any other approach disrespects the 
“ontology, mystery, and beauty” of the particular.398 When applied to a person, 
however, this idea of the mystery of the particular is more than an assertion of 
an inarticulable attraction to the particular, more than a mere embrace of it on 
aesthetic grounds. Rather, it is a way of expressing awe at the infinite value of 
the individual as unique and irreplaceable, no matter what wrongs he has 
donean idea, a value deeply rooted in Judeo-Christian teaching.399 So viewed, 
Bankowski’s language of mystery and awe can be seen as an expression of 
respect for a deeply rooted American value. In this light, Bankowski’s words 
can be read as encapsulating the prayerful worship of the individual that 
underlies American justice: 
[T]hat you, I, a flower, or any part of the world exists is a mystery. Here then is 
something that I cannot completely grasp or understand. It is that which gives it its 
beauty, the fact that it will always be something beyond me. It is this integrity that I 
must respect and stand in awe of.400 
Individualized suspicion is the law’s expression of that awe. It is a way of 
educating law enforcement that our society values the individual for herself, a 
reminder to grant her some minimal measure of respect no matter what we 
suspect she has done. 
d. Political diversity. Earlier, I discussed the benefits for the individual of 
the drive toward developing a unique personality. But promoting human 
uniqueness, thus human diversity, has broader consequences for political 
society, not merely for the individual. Central to a healthy democratic polity is 
 
 393. Zenon Bankowski & James MacLean, Introduction, in THE UNIVERSAL AND THE 
PARTICULAR IN LEGAL REASONING, supra note 384, xi, xii. 
 394. See id. at xii. 
 395. See id. 
 396. See id. 
 397. Id. 
 398. See Bankowski, supra note 384, at 31 (relying on the ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein). 
 399. See, e.g., MISHNA SANHEDRIN 4:5 (“Therefore was a single man [Adam] only created to teach 
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the existence and communication of diverse views.401 The energetic exchange of 
such views aids in avoiding error; helps to “create” a public or common good 
concerning principles of political morality; and encourages a republican citizen 
character of dissent.402 A culture of conformity, in this view, is the antithesis 
ofthe death ofdemocracy.403 
Once again, John Stuart Mill saw the point, emphasizing the need to “enable 
resistance to the public demand for uniformity.”404 “Without such resistance,” he 
declared, “society will be peopled by creatures of ‘weak feelings’ and ‘weak 
energies.’”405 Such weaknesses, he explained, would render persons 
“dependents” or “subjects” rather than independent citizens.406 Dependency on 
government, in Mill’s view, was inconsistent with the British character. “[I]t 
was,” he said, “men of another stamp that made England what it has been.”407 
Accordingly, he concluded, “men of another stamp will be needed to prevent its 
decline.”408 
Variants of Mill’s arguments have been warmly embraced by many 
academics and at times by courts in the First Amendment free-speech context.409 
But Fourth and First Amendment values and principles are intimately linked.410 
As noted earlier, without privacy and freedom of movement, individual (and 
group) uniqueness cannot thrive.411 Likewise, property is necessary to protect 
and enable privacy and free movement (if all were homeless, none would have 
privacy; if none had cars or bicycles, few could travel far).412 Such diversity of 
character and ideas is essential to diversity of expressed viewpoints.413 Fourth 
Amendment interests are a prerequisite to healthy free speech. 
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Totalitarian societies understand this speech–privacy connection all too 
well. Taming a people requires instilling the fear in them that all they do and 
say can be seen and heard. It is no accident that George Orwell’s dystopian 
novel, 1984, concerned a world in which “thought police” had access to every 
person’s home, job, and telephone.414 More recently, author Margaret Atwood, 
in her novel, The Handmaid’s Tale, conjures up a vision of religious 
totalitarianism enforced by the virtual absence of privacy for subjugated 
persons.415 So pervasively does this contribute to conformity that many of the 
oppressed not only behave as expected but think as expected, losing the capacity 
to be different.416 Mill himself feared exactly this metaphorical eye. “In our own 
times, from the highest class . . . down to the lowest,” said Mill, “everyone lives 
as under the eye of a dreaded and hostile censorship.”417 That eye and its 
judgment penetrate everywhere, “leav[ing] fewer means of escape, penetrating 
much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself.”418 
In the post-World War II period, American judges themselves saw clearly 
the spectre of totalitarianism that arose from deprivation of privacy, property, 
and locomotive rights.419 In the wake of Hitler’s Germany, the mere risk of the 
state’s invading these rights worried many in the judiciary. What might 
seemingly start small, as had Nazism, could, if replicated often enough, 
metastasize into ever-expansive censorship and oppression. 
The unmistakable influence of fears of totalitarianism appeared in various 
Justices’ opinions with regularity throughout the postwar period.420 In Johnson 
v. United States,421 for example, Justice Jackson stressed the centrality of the 
warrant requirement, worrying that “[a]ny other rule would undermine ‘the 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,’ and 
would obliterate one of the most fundamental distinctions between our form of 
government, where officers are under the law, and the police-state where they 
are the law.”422 Justice Frankfurter expressed a similar sentiment, arguing in 
Wolf v. Colorado423 that if the Fourth Amendment, originally applicable only to 
the federal government, were not read as being incorporated against the states 
by the Fourteenth Amendment, Americans would need to fear the “knock at 
the door, whether by day or by night, as a prelude to search, without authority, 
but solely on the authority of the police.”424 Totalitarian comparisons were most 
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passionately used in dissents, expressly decrying majorities’ positions as 
ignoring the importance of “avoiding the dangers of a police state.”425 
Appellate-court dissenters like Jerome Frank also went so far as to condemn 
monitoring radio transmitters because that was reminiscent of Hitler’s secret 
police and Orwell’s 1984.426 Perhaps the most memorable quote from the 
Supreme Court’s dissenters, however, was this one, again by Justice Jackson: 
Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the 
spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart [as unfettered search and 
seizure]. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective 
weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government. And one need only briefly to 
have dwelt and worked among a people possessed of many admirable qualities but 
deprived of these rights to know that the human personality deteriorates and dignity 
and self-reliance disappear where homes, persons and possessions are subject at any 
hour to unheralded search and seizure by the police.427 
Later, the villain switched from Nazism to Communism, particularly Soviet-
style communism.428 Yet the message remained the same, and faint echoes of it 
appear in more-recent opinions.429 Professor Margaret Raymond has traced in 
detail the rise and fall of antitotalitarian rhetoric; she embraces the wisdom of 
such rhetoric as essential if the risk of tyranny that prompted the Founders to 
craft the Fourth Amendment is not to become seen as but a historical oddity—
no danger worthy of real concern in contemporary society.430 The Justices most 
loudly warning against modern tyranny understood, says Raymond, that 
“particular police practices, if permitted, will open the door to 
totalitarianism . . . .”431 Losing the passion that antitotalitarian rhetoric invoked, 
Raymond wisely warned, reduces any appeal to an ugly twentieth-century past 
as a mere “rote recitation, part of a list of distant outrages,”432 ones which the 
“speaker no longer recalls and can no longer express with the fervor that 
characterizes the true believer.”433 The risk is therefore run that these appeals, 
and the Fourth Amendment itself, will become “mere words,” sound without 
fury. 
Jed Rubenfeld embraces a similar approach to the Fourth Amendment. 
Analogizing to Immanuel Kant’s idea of determining moral imperatives by 
exploring their significance if generalized, Rubenfeld asks judges to take into 
account the effect that their constitutional search and seizure decisions will have 
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if their implicit or explicit principles are made widespread.434 Rubenfeld does 
not ask what would happen if the principles were made universal, but only what 
would happen if they were “implemented on a scale broad enough to become 
part of common people’s knowledge and everyday life.”435 What matters is not 
whether the principle has been so implemented, but whether its consequences 
raise the risk of fostering, in even a small way, a totalitarian culture.436 For 
example, current doctrine finds no “privacy” violation in allowing undercover 
police agents to gain entry to intimate relationships, political groups, and 
homes.437 However, argues Rubenfeld, if generalized from the tactic’s being used 
against drug dealers or suspected terrorists to everyone in all contexts, the 
result would be a conformist society of fear filled with weak citizens unable to 
trust family, friends, employers, or even spiritual advisors.438 That thought 
experiment suggests to Rubenfeld not a flat ban on undercover agents, but at 
least some measure of constitutional regulation.439 
Rubenfeld roots his argument in taking seriously the Fourth Amendment’s 
declaration that it protects a right of “the People” to be “secure.”440 Insecurity, 
to Rubenfeld, results in the fear generated by significant risks of invasions of 
personal life.441 A single decision may alone validate state invasion of privacy, 
locomotive, or property rights for a relatively small class of persons or, even 
more narrowly, only for the parties then before the court. However, if the 
principle the case creates is not explicitly cabined, there is no logical limit to its 
growth.442 Freedom may erode slowly rather than in a rush, but it will just as 
 
 434. See Rubenfeld, supra note 240, at 22024; IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE 
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 37 (Allen W. Wood ed. & trans., 2002) (1785) (“Act only in accordance 
with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.”). 
 435. See Rubenfeld, supra note 240, at 222. 
 436. See id. at 22224. 
 437. See id. For a summary of the Fourth Amendment law on undercover agents, see TASLITZ, 
PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 11820, 196200, 22124. 
 438. See Rubenfeld, supra note 240, at 223. Rubenfeld remarks, 
Were covert informants and police agents to become ubiquitous, a great deal more than a loss 
of privacy would ensue. The true loss would be born by everyone, including those who were 
never spied on (therefore suffering no actual governmental invasion of their privacy) and 
those who stopped saying anything personal to anyone else (therefore never suffering an 
exposure of anything private). A society with ubiquitous undercover agents is a secret police 
state. It is a state that deliberately seeks to destroy the security that people enjoy in their 
personal lives—the confidence that what ones does in personal life belongs to personal life 
and will not generally be known to public authorities. 
Id. 
 439. See id. at 22324. 
 440. See id. at 20910. 
 441. See id. at 21118. 
 442. See id. at 22024. 
TASLITZ 12/22/2010  3:32:52 PM 
202 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 73:145 
surely wither away if the state seems to have the power to wound it, even if it 
has not yet chosen to do so fully.443 
This insecurity is a harm to the People, not merely to individuals, precisely 
because it threatens the nature of the political society that the Fourth 
Amendment aspires for America to become.444 The collectivity as a whole, not 
merely its parts, suffers.445 
The individualized-suspicion requirement plays an important role in this 
antitotalitarian political culture. By putting up a significant obstacle to invading 
personal life, it creates an important, albeit not impassable, roadblock to the 
too-ready state erosion of privacy, property, and free movement.446 Moreover, it 
does so by showing respect for individual uniqueness and diversity, the very 
supports necessary to a diverse, open society of strong-willed citizen voices. 
These political ramifications matter as much to preserving the individualized-
suspicion ideal as do the harms likely to be done to individual persons and 
groups by the ideal’s demise. 
IV 
IMPLICATIONS 
An awareness of the benefits of the individualized-suspicion requirement 
make apparent the simple point that such awareness has practical significance 
as well as theoretical importance. First, the individualized-suspicion 
requirement should not be tossed overboard in favor of a generalization unless 
the generalization is at least a nonspurious one; second, if there is a good reason 
to jettison the requirement, every effort should be made to find alternative 
means for attaining the benefits that would have obtained had the requirement 
not been compromised. 
That despite its benefits, it sometimes makes sense to modify or eliminate 
the individualized-suspicion requirement assumes, of course, that the 
requirement comes with costs—the flipside of the benefits of that requirement. 
Indeed, there are a variety of such costs. Articulation of these costs, though 
often not all in one location, is, unlike articulation of the benefits, so ubiquitous 
in much modern scholarship and case law that little citation is necessary. 
Plowing this garden tills familiar soil.447 
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A.  The Costs of Individualized Suspicion 
Requiring individualized suspicion imposes eight potential primary costs. 
First, precisely because acquiring such suspicion can sometimes be difficult, 
fewer searches and seizures will occur. But that may mean that more guilty 
persons escape justice.448 Of course, the mere existence of the Fourth 
Amendment necessarily reduces crime-detection effectiveness. If police could 
break into homes, arrest persons willy-nilly, hold them for long periods of 
interrogation, all without any need to justify these police actions, doubtless 
more crime would be discovered and punished. But many more innocent 
persons would be swept up as well. Still, the costs cannot be ignored, and, in 
theory, if these costs become sufficiently high, crime could rise to a point at 
which social stability is threatened, prompting a harsh backlash against robust 
civil-liberties protections. 
Second, and relatedly, if a high enough number of criminals escape justice, 
specific and general deterrence will falter.449 Unpunished criminals see no reason 
not to offend again, and previously law-abiding persons seeing little chance of 
harsh consequences from wrongdoing may in the future turn to crimes from 
which they might otherwise have desisted.450 
Third, in some instances, the time needed for investigation to establish 
individualized suspicion can have grave consequences. Specifically, as when 
terrorism is involved, enormous imminent harm can be avoided only by prompt 
action unsupported by individualized suspicion. In the perhaps-fanciful, ticking-
nuclear-time-bomb scenario,451 police strongly suspect that a nuclear weapon 
will wipe New York City from the map within an hour. Yet, lacking 
individualized suspicion, they let millions of Americans die. Real-world 
scenarios are likely to leave much less at stake, with whether harm is 
“imminent” being an open question. Nevertheless, all that humans can fairly be 
expected to do is to make their best judgments in an uncertain world. Even if 
the harm raised and the certainty of its occurrence are much lessperhaps a 
threat by kidnappers to kill a single child if ransom is not delivered within an 
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hourthe consequences of delay can involve substantial human pain that 
cannot be ignored. Civil liberties have their price. 
Fourth, unbending application of an individualized-suspicion requirement 
can dramatically raise the costs of meeting it. For example, police may find 
themselves with inadequate evidence of probable cause to search a home. They 
may, however, have some reason to believe that a suspect’s cell phone, which he 
sometimes leaves unguarded on his desk, contains evidence sufficient to give 
the police the probable cause they are lacking.452 If an individualized-suspicion 
requirement bars searching the cell phone, police may never catch the bad guy. 
On the other hand, if they are free surreptitiously to read his cell phone when it 
is unguarded, that may give them individualized suspicion sufficient to obtain a 
search warrant for his home. The choice is therefore not necessarily between 
individualized suspicion and nothing. Rather, the breadth of the mandate can 
be varied, sometimes requiring individualized suspicion, sometimes not. An 
unbending obsession with such suspicion may, therefore, impose significant 
social costs that a more flexible scheme might reduce. 
Fifth, individualized-suspicion mandates impose significant out-of-pocket 
and opportunity costs. Police must do more investigation.453 Sometimes this 
investigation may be modest, perhaps standing on a street corner unobtrusively 
observing a suspect a few minutes longer. But, other times, the expense in time 
and money can be far greater, including such things as extended stakeouts, 
undercover work, covert fingerprinting, DNA testing, and a host of other 
activities.454 Moreover, every extra minute that police spend investigating one 
case that may or may not pan out is a minute subtracted from another potential 
case or from such crime-preventative activities as building community trust via 
neighborhood meetings and other community-policing efforts. 
Sixth, individualized suspicion may for all practical purposes be impossible 
to attain in certain settings, at least at a tolerable cost. For example, inspecting 
homes for fire-code violations would be virtually impossible if such inspections 
could be done based only upon probable cause.455 Yet even one resulting serious 
fire risks spreading, perhaps sacrificing, an entire neighborhood. 
Seventh, a too-robust and widespread individualized-suspicion mandate may 
itself harm the law’s legitimacy. If the state cannot protect its citizens’ 
safetyone of the central American ideological justifications for having a 
statethen how can citizens be expected to accept and defer to state actions in 
that and other areas? 
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Eighth, judges fearing just these sorts of costs may dramatically limit the 
scope of Fourth Amendment protections. They can do so by narrowly defining 
what constitutes a “search” or a “seizure”thus narrowing when the Fourth 
Amendment even applies in the first placeor by diluting those protections 
that do apply, for example, finding individualized suspicion based upon weak 
evidence of questionable trustworthiness. 
B.  Illustrations 
1. The Case of the Spurious Generalization 
If generalizations are to be used in place of individualized suspicion, all 
agree that the generalizations should not be spurious ones.456 Yet a majority of 
the Supreme Court has shown little interest in seriously examining this 
question, either ignoring it or simply assuming the generalizations’ nonspurious 
nature. 
In Illinois v. Wardlow,457 the Court held that unprovoked flight from the 
police is sufficient to establish particularized reasonable suspicion in a high-
crime, but not in a low-crime, area. The majority considered such flight 
“suggestive” of wrongdoing without clearly explaining why.458 Its implicit logic 
seems to be this: a high-crime area by definition contains a higher percentage of 
criminals than does a low-crime area. Furthermore, unprovoked 
flight“wherever it occursis the consummate act of evasion . . . .”459 The 
Court conceded, however, that there may be other, innocent reasons for such 
flight, and that flight itself is not an illegal activity.460 Nevertheless, the majority 
concluded that “Terry accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent 
people.”461 Apparently, the Court saw that risk as acceptable in a high-crime 
area because the higher chance of catching the guilty there means both that 
fewer innocent persons will be caught in the law’s web, and that the 
probabilities of a significant payoff, namely catching a guilty offender, were 
worth the “minimal intrusion” costs of a Terry stop.462 
The Court based its analysis of a fair reading of flight’s meaning in the 
particular location on its own intuition. The Court expressly rejected its 
competence to do otherwise, declaring that the judiciary does “not have 
available empirical studies dealing with inferences drawn from suspicious 
behavior, and . . . cannot reasonably demand scientific certainty from judges or 
law enforcement officers where none exists.”463 Accordingly, the determination 
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of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and 
inferences about human behavior.464 
But commonsense judgments can fall short, and “scientific certainty,” 
whatever the Court means by that phrase, is not necessary. Ample quality social 
science was available, in a way easily accessible to lawyers, calling into question 
the accuracy of the Court’s generalization that flight from police in a high-crime 
area was indicative of consciousness of guilt. Indeed, Justice Stevens, in an 
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Justices Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer,465 relied on just such social-science evidenceevidence to 
which the majority offered no response. 
Justice Stevens reviewed that social science in six separate footnotes, some 
of them lengthy. These footnotes reviewed, among other matters, the high 
percentages of African Americans who consider police harassment a serious 
problem in their own community; the belief by many minorities that field 
interrogations are conducted in an abusive manner; the high percentages of 
minority stop-and-frisks that do not result in an arrest; the disproportionate 
percentage of minority street stops in many major cities; the belief by even 
substantial percentages of police in at least one major city that its department’s 
officers exhibit racial bias; the New Jersey Attorney General’s conclusion that 
racial profiling by troopers on the state’s highways was real, not imagined; and 
the Massachusetts Attorney General’s conclusion that Terry stop-and-frisks 
were done in a particularly demeaning mannerfor example, public strip 
searcheswhen aimed at minorities.466 This ample data, explained Stevens, 
meant that for some citizens, “particularly minorities and those residing in high-
crime areas, there is also the possibility that the fleeing person is entirely 
innocent, but, with or without justification, believes that contact with the police 
can itself be dangerous, apart from any criminal activity associated with the 
officer’s sudden presence.”467 Stevens concluded, “For such a person, 
unprovoked flight is neither ‘aberrant’ nor ‘abnormal.’”468 Given officers’ own 
recognition of the problem and support from law-enforcement agencies’ 
internal investigations of their own practices, Stevens considered “the 
reasonableness of these beliefs . . . too pervasive to be dismissed as random or 
rare, and too persuasive to be disparaged as inconclusive or insufficient.”469 The 
data was, in short, sufficient to support a “commonsense conclusion” that 
unprovoked flight can occur for innocent reasons.470 
Stevens also relied on other social science, case law, and the Bible to 
buttress the argument that innocent persons may flee from the police, apart 
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from the location where a stop occurs, for a wealth of innocent reasons: the 
belief that police presence suggests physical danger from criminals themselves 
or from an impending police–criminal confrontation, the fear of humiliation by 
being wrongly associated with a criminal act, or the annoyance or expense of 
explaining or defending themselves.471 Stevens conceded that flight can also be 
consistent with consciousness of guilt of crime.472 He intended, though, not to 
banish flight from consideration but rather to make two major points: First, 
given that flight could support entirely opposite inferencesinnocence or 
guiltthe burden must be on the state to justify the latter inference as the more 
sensible one; and, second, that a per se rulea generalization about high-crime 
neighborhoods and flight’s meaning therecould not be justified as a departure 
from the constitutionally preferable course that the original Terry opinion 
directed—a case-specific assessment of individualized suspicion based upon a 
thorough analysis of the totality of the circumstances.473 As Stevens put it, 
Given the diversity and frequency of possible motivations for flight, it would be 
profoundly unwise to endorse either per se rule [that flight in a high-crime 
neighborhood establishes reasonable suspicion alone or that it never matters]. The 
inference we can reasonably draw about the motivation for a person’s flight, rather, 
will depend on a number of circumstances. Factors such as the time of day, the 
number of people in the area, the character of the neighborhood, whether the officer 
was in uniform, the way the runner was dressed, the direction and speed of the flight, 
and whether the person’s behavior was otherwise unusual might be relevant in specific 
cases. This number of variables is surely sufficient to preclude either a bright-line rule 
that always justifies, or that never justifies, an investigative stop based on the sole fact 
that flight began after a police officer appeared nearby.474 
But, concluded Stevens, the record was far too vague, filled with stunning 
gaps and surprising lapses of officer memory, for the state to meet its burden of 
meeting Stevens’ totality-of-the-circumstances test for particularized 
suspicion.475 Furthermore, even were a generalization to be made based upon 
the extent of crime occurring in the neighborhood, the better-supported 
generalization would be quite the opposite of that urged by the state and 
accepted by the Court: 
The State, along with a majority of the Court, relies as well on the assumption that this 
flight occurred in a high crime area. Even if that assumption is accurate, it is 
insufficient because even in a high crime neighborhood unprovoked flight does not 
invariably lead to reasonable suspicion. On the contrary, because many factors 
providing innocent motivations for unprovoked flight are concentrated in high crime 
areas, the character of the neighborhood arguably makes an inference of guilt less 
appropriate, rather than more so. Like unprovoked flight itself, presence in a high 
crime neighborhood is a fact too generic and susceptible to innocent explanations to 
satisfy the reasonable suspicion inquiry.476 
 
 471. See id. at 13034 & nn.56; Proverbs 22:3 (King James) (“A shrewd man sees trouble coming 
and lies low; the simple walk into it and pay the penalty.”). 
 472. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 129 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 473. See id. at 12930 & n.4; see also id. at 140. 
 474. Id. at 12930. 
 475. See id. at 13740. 
 476. Id. at 139. 
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Schauer himself supports using only nonspurious generalizations, and ones 
on which the state, not the suspect, bears the burden of persuasion.477 Stevens’ 
view, not the majority’s in Wardlow, is thus the sounder one, even for readers 
accepting the frequent wisdom of relying on generalities. For those who, like 
myself, are far more skeptical of such reliance, Stevens’ embrace of case-specific 
particularity is wiser still. 
2. Minimizing Generalization’s Harm 
The Court has long embraced an “assumption of risk” doctrine, also often 
called the “third-party doctrine,”478 which generally renders police’s obtaining 
information that had been voluntarily shared by an individual with a third party 
devoid of a reasonable expectation of privacy.479 The practical effect of this 
doctrine is to free such police conduct from constitutional regulation under the 
Fourth Amendment.480 
The American Bar Association (ABA) recently appointed a task force to 
draft standards regulating government access to third-party records in criminal 
investigations.481 That appointment necessarily reflects a judgment that the 
third-party doctrine is, as a matter of policy, unwise.482 Yet the task force’s draft 
standards recognize that regulating such access does not necessarily mean 
barring it, or even imposing probable cause as a routine obstacle to access. 
Rather, the task force’s draft standards create four categories of third-party 
records. Those categories are “highly protected,” “moderately protected,” 
“minimally protected,” or “unprotected.”483 The category into which a record 
falls is based on weighing a variety of factors, including the extent to which the 
initial information transfer is “reasonably necessary to participate meaningfully 
in society or is socially beneficial, including free and robust expression”; the 
“extent to which the information is personal,” meaning intimate or likely to 
cause stigma or embarrassment if disclosed, or “typically disclosed only within 
one’s close social network”; the extent to which the public is aware of the 
information’s accessibility by those outside the third-party entity; and the extent 
to which the law already restricts accessing or disseminating the information, 
including by government.484 Note that these concerns address several, though by 
no means all, of the justifications for having a sturdy individualized-suspicion 
 
 477. See supra text accompanying notes 10935. 
 478. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 116–21; Orin Kerr, The Case for the Third-
Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561 (2009). 
 479. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Government Access to Private Records, Draft Version 
5.0 8–10 (2009). 
 480. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 116–21. 
 481. See ABA Standards, supra note 479, at 1–8. 
 482. See id. at 8–10. 
 483. See id. at 11–16, 1920. 
 484. See id.  
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requirement, particularly the benefits of privacy in promoting free expression, 
intimacy, and freedom from stigma.485 
Absent consent or exigency, the standards vary the degree of justification 
required for government access to individuals’ information held by third-party 
entities based upon the category of record involved.486 A warrant based upon 
probable cause is required for highly protected information; a court order based 
upon reasonable suspicion to believe that the information in the record is 
relevant to an investigation is required for moderately protected information 
(such as financial transactions and balances); a judicial subpoena based upon a 
judicial determination of a “reasonable possibility” that a record contains 
information relevant to an investigation is required for minimally protected 
information (such as utility bills); but unprotected information relevant to an 
investigation requires no more than an officer’s mere request based upon the 
officer’s own belief in a reasonable possibility that the record contains such 
information.487 
This sliding scale seeks to accommodate the individual and social interests in 
protecting the information against legitimate law-enforcement needs. The task 
force thus concluded that, at least under some circumstances, imposing meaty 
individualized-suspicion requirements would unduly hamper law enforcement 
for relatively little social gain.488 At the same time, the standards recognize that 
diluted individualized suspicion (reasonable suspicion via a court order) is often 
preferable to none and that, when that is not so, at least relevancy requirements 
determined by neutral, independent third parties (the judiciary) are preferable 
to unguided officer discretion. Retaining judicial involvement, requiring 
advance justifications, and requiring at least some articulable basis for action 
retains many of the benefits of the strongest individualized-suspicion 
requirement (probable cause) while reducing its costs.489 
But the standards go further, requiring, for example, notice to various 
persons affected, including for some records notice to the “general public”; 
imposing auditing, security, integrity, limited access, relatively prompt 
destruction, and accuracy requirements on government retention and use of 
seized records or information contained therein; and imposing accountability 
requirements.490 Accountability mechanisms include administrative sanctions 
pursuant to specifically drafted rules, civil liability, criminal liability for serious 
violations, periodic review, and periodic public reports summarizing search-
and-seizure practices. Politically accountable officials are involved in many of 
the proposed standards’ protective mechanisms.491 
 
 485. See supra text accompanying notes 210446. 
 486. See ABA Standards, supra note 479, at 20. 
 487. See id. at 20. 
 488. See id. at 116. 
 489. See supra part III (detailing social benefits of individualized suspicion). 
 490. See ABA Standards, supra note 479, at 2123. 
 491. See id. at 17, 19. 
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I am not opining on the wisdom of the precise details of the draft, nor do I 
plan here to offer and defend specific examples of records that I believe should 
fit in one category of justification or another. But I do approve of the draft’s 
recognition that sometimes the cost of the most powerful individualized-
suspicion requirement is too high but that departure from it should be reluctant, 
gradual, and based upon increasingly pressing need. I also embrace the draft’s 
effort, as it dilutes or eliminates individualized-suspicion requirements, to 
preserve many of their benefits, including political accountability and voice, 
limits on police discretion, fair notice, and efforts to minimize individual 
humiliation and the risks of error.492 Concerning political accountability, the 
ABA has gone even farther in a related area, video surveillance of the public, 
requiring direct citizen participation in periodically monitoring and critiquing 
government surveillance operations.493 Of this, too, I strongly approve. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
In this article I have sought to clarify the individualized-suspicion 
requirement’s meaning and to develop in some detail several of its most 
important major social benefits. At the same time, the article recognizes the 
need at times for the state to dilute or jettison the individualized-suspicion 
mandate. But, in doing so, the state should be aware of the mandate’s 
purposesincluding promoting distributive and procedural fairness; protecting 
affected persons’ and the people’s political voice and autonomy; encouraging 
police transparency and accountability; protecting privacy, individual 
uniqueness and political diversity; preserving narrative integrity and human 
dignity; and maintaining the mystery and awe of treating persons as unique and 
infinitely valuable individuals. Without mandating individualized suspicion, the 
full panoply of its benefits cannot likely be maintained with appropriate vigor. 
But every effort should be made to do so. 
The ABA’s law-reform efforts described above illustrate how this might be 
accomplished. Moreover, when reliance on generalization is required, as Justice 
Stevens’ Wardlow dissent demonstrates, the state should bear the burden at 
least of proving that the generalization is nonspurious. If both these cautions 
are heeded, Fourth Amendment and related statutory law and executive search-
and-seizure practices will move toward a fairer, more accurate, and more 
legitimate form while better safeguarding public safety. 
 
 
 492. See id. at 23. 
 493. See TASLITZ, supra note 4, at 5960. 
